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1.  INTRODUCTION
1.  In  the  last  fifteen  years  privatization  has  become  a  central  element  of the  structural
reform  agenda  in  developed  and developing  countries  alike.  Indeed,  it is  now  quite  difficult  to
find a  country that has  not  embarked  on  a program  to divest  some  or  all of its  state-owned
enterprises  (SOEs)  or  to  involve  the  private  sector  in  their  management,  ownership,  and
financing.
2.  The reasons  for the rise of privatization are well-established.  In general, SOEs performed,
and continue to perform, poorly.  They proved wasteful  and inefficient, tending to produce goods
and  services  of low  quality  and high cost.  They became  seriously overstaffed  as  governments
used them to generate and maintain employment.  Sheltered  from competition,  SOEs often were
instructed  to  keep  their  prices  low,  resulting  in  mounting  financial  losses  that in  some  cases
amounted  to as much as  5 to 6 percent of GDP.  This led to bailouts  and fiscal strains,  first  on
government  budgets  and  latterly  on  the  banking  system.  Covering  SOE  losses  with  fiscal
transfers required governments  to finance larger fiscal deficits and increase tax revenues or, more
commonly,  reduce  public  expenditures  in  other  areas,  or  both.  The  financing  of SOE  losses
through the  state  banking  system  increased  intermediation  costs,  reduced  the  private  sector's
access  to  credit,  and  threatened  overall  financial  sector  viability.  Increasingly  constrained
governments  also became  incapable of providing capital to their SOEs, even the profitable  ones,
for maintenance and repair, much less badly-needed network expansion and re-tooling.
3.  Numerous  attempts through the  1970s and 80s to reform SOEs by imposing hard budget
constraints,  exposing  them  to  competition,  and  introducing  institutional  changes  (e.g.,  in  the
selection  and  qualifications  of  the  Board  of Directors,  in  the  training  and  remuneration  of
managers,  in "contractualizing"  the  relationship  between  the  government  and  the  firm,  etc.)
produced meager results.  In  instances where the initial  results  of such reform  were promising,
the  achievements  proved  unsustainable;  back-sliding  was  common.  By the  end  of the  1980s,
Government  ownership itself increasingly came to be seen as  a principal  reason  for the inability
to  effect  major  and  enduring  SOE  reform.  The  perception  arose  that  the  merits  of  public
ownership  and management  of productive  assets had  been oversold,  and  that the potential  for
introducing private entry and participation had been underestimated.  This  shift accompanied  the
early privatization programs in Great Britain and a few other OECD countries, which then served
as a powerful demonstration effect for countries worldwide. Privatization  thus came to be widely
accepted as a tool to improve SOE performance and reduce the budgetary burden caused by their
inefficiencies.
4.  Despite  the  extensive  adoption  of  privatization,  it  has  from  the  outset  been  highly
controversial and politically charged.  First, there are those who claim that privatization  does not
produce financial and operational benefits, or at least not enough to offset the social dislocation  it
causes. Second, there is an acute and pervasive  fear that privatization leads  to layoffs,  first in the2
short-term in the firms  divested, and then in the  longer-run  and in the economy  at large.  Third,
there is a widespread belief that even if privatization enhances  efficiency, the bulk of its benefits
accrue  to  a privileged  few-shareholders,  managers,  domestic  or foreign  business  interests,
those  connected  to  the  political  elite-while  the  costs  are  borne  by  the  many,  particularly
workers  and  consumers.  In  addition,  many  are  concerned  that  lack  of transparency  and
corruption  in the  privatization  process  itself has  minimized  the  intended  gains  and  led  to  or
deepened broader problems of governance.
5.  This paper takes stock of the empirical  evidence  on privatization  outcomes, and-on the
basis  of this  evidence-highlights  the  conditions  for  success.  The  paper  deals  mainly  with
traditional  privatization  efforts  involving  enterprises  operating  in competitive  markets;  it does
not  cover  infrastructure  enterprises  (which  are  the  subject  of a  separate  background  paper),'
though  a  number  of  general  issues  arising  from  infrastructure  privatization  are  mentioned.
Section 2 provides a brief review of overall privatization trends over the past ten years.  Section 3
reviews  the  literature  on  the  micro-  and  macroeconomic  impacts  of privatization,  and  also
examines the employment and broader distributional impact.  Section 4 highlights the key factors
for successful privatization.
2.  PRrVATIZATION  TRENDS2
6.  Privatization  activity has grown  in the past ten years, both in terms of number and value
of transactions.  In  the  1980s there were  only a few transactions  on average  per year,  but by the
late  1990s the annual  average rose to about 500.  Between  1990  and  1999, total  global proceeds
amounted to US$850  billion,  growing  from  $30 billion in  1990  to $145  billion in  1999 (Figure
1).  Developed countries account  for the bulk of the proceeds,  mainly from public  offerings of
large firms in countries of the European Union (Mahboobi, 2000).
'  Gray 2001.
2  Global  data  on  numbers  of  enterprises  privatized  are  not  readily  available.  Compiling  this  information  from
country  level data  is a difficult  task given problems of consistency  and comparability;  for example,  some  countries
include  the  privatization  of small  retail  outlets  in  their  figures  while  others  exclude  them.  Data  on  global
privatization  proceeds  are  available  from  the  World  Bank's  Global  Development  Finance,  2001,  on  which  this
section  is based.  The data  is  on an announcement  basis rather than on the  basis of actual  flows of receipts,  which
means that privatization  commitments  do not reflect  receipts  in  a particular  year,  as transactions  may be  paid for
over several  years. Data on privatization revenues should be viewed cautiously as  they can be  concentrated in a few
large public  offerings  and thus do not reflect the scope  or progress of a country's  overall program.  The discussion
here is mainly intended to provide  an overview of broad trends rather than comprehensive  coverage of privatization
activities to date.3
Figure 1: Global  Privatization Proceeds
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7.  Privatization  activity  in  developing  countries  has  been  growing.  While  no  accurate
account is available, it is safe to say that tens of thousands of enterprises have been sold. A rough
estimate  is that  $250  billion in  revenues  were  raised  between  1990-1999.  Proceeds  increased
four-fold  since  1990,  reaching  $44  billion  in  1999  after  a  peak  of  $66  billion  in  1997.  The
revenues  are  largely  accounted  for by  infrastructure  privatization,  mainly  telecommunications
and  power,  followed  by  the  primary  sector,  including  petroleum,  mining,  agriculture,  and
forestry.  Recent  large  sales  have  been  concentrated  in  the  oil  and  gas  sectors  in Argentina,
Brazil,  India, Poland and Russia.  Manufacturing  privatizations  raised  about  16 percent  of total
developing country proceeds between 1990-99, mainly from sales in Eastem and Central Europe
and Latin America (Figure 2A).
Figure 2A:  Privatization  Proceeds  by  Figure 2B:  Privatization Proceeds  by
Sector,  1990-99  Region,  1990.99
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8.  In regional  terms, Latin America accounted  for a large share of non-OECD privatization
activity,  particularly  in  terms  of revenues  (Figure  2B).  Countries  such  as  Argentina,  Brazil,
Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico sold small and medium sized firms at first, but rapidly expanded  their4
programs  to  include  large  infrastructure  and  energy  firms;  the  largest  contributions  in  recent
years came from the sale of infrastructure  and/or energy firms in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico.
9.  Eastern  Europe  and  Central  Asia  sold  the  most  number  of firms  as  a  result  of mass
privatization programs which,  mainly prior to 1995,  divested thousands  of enterprises in Russia,
the Czech  Republic,  Kazakhstan,  Lithuania,  Moldova  and  Mongolia  (among  others).  But  the
revenues  raised were minimal  due  to the use of vouchers.3 Since  1995,  however,  privatization
revenues  have been  growing  as  countries  such as  Estonia,  Hungary,  Poland,  Russia,  Slovakia,
and others began case-by-case sales,  including  large  firms in banking,  transport, oil and gas,  and
infrastructure.  In  1999,  the region accounted  for  24 percent  of developing country privatization
proceeds compared to  18 percent in  1994.
10.  Prior to the  financial  crisis of 1997,  East Asian  countries  opted  for  a different  strategy,
concentrating  on  opening  up  their  economies  to  new  private  entry,  rather  than  privatizing
existing  enterprises.  This  approach  was  workable,  given-outside  of China-the  region's
comparatively  smaller  reliance  on  SOEs  as  agents  of  economic  policy,  and  the  success  of
China's evolutionary  approach to property  reform (Box  1).  However,  the altered circumstances
post-crisis,  and the need in China to face the burgeoning  financial  problems of the largest SOEs,
led  to  a  renewed  emphasis  on  privatization;  some  of  the  larger  companies  are  now  being
privatized.  The  region  accounted  for  12  percent  of total  proceeds  in  1999,  with  the  sale  of
minority  shares  in  two  large  enterprises  in  China  accounting  for  half of all  regional  activity,
followed by Thailand and Indonesia.
11.  Privatization  revenues  in  the  Middle  East  and  North  Africa  have  been  modest,  but
growing  in recent  years,  largely  as  a result of Morocco's  telecom  sale  and the privatization  of
cement and other medium to large  sized  companies  in Egypt.  In  South Asia,  Sri Lanka has  had
an  active  program  covering  virtually  all  sectors  (including  infrastructure)  but,  in  terms  of
revenues,  India accounted  for the bulk of regional  revenues  in the past few years  as a result of
minority  share  sales  in  large  companies.  (The  extent  to  which  such  minority  sales  effect
efficiency and operating results is questionable,  particularly since most of the sales have been to
financial institutions that are themselves  state-influenced or controlled;  see para. 25  below.)  The
number  of sales  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  has risen  greatly  over the past  five years,  from  175  in
1990  to  over  400  in  1996.4  By  1998,  over 3,000  transactions  had  been  completed,  mainly in
Mozambique,  Angola,  Ghana,  Zambia,  Kenya,  Tanzania,  and  Guinea  (Campbell  White  and
Bhatia,  1998).  But the  relatively small size  of the divested  firms limited  the financial  impact:
African  sales  accounted  for 3 percent  of total  developing  country  proceeds  between  1990 and
1999.
3 In East Germany,  which also privatized  a  large  number of firms,  revenue  generation  was decidedly  secondary to
finding  good owners;  the seller  accepted lower prices  in return  for investment  and  employment  commitments  from
the new owners.
4 This number includes  the sale of small retail units and establishments and the sale of minority shares.Box  1:  SOE Reform in China
China  launched  a  major  economic  reform  and  liberalization  program  in  the  late  1970s  that  transformed  the
productivity  of the  Chinese  economy.  China's  approach  to  ownership  change  in  industrial  firms  has  evolved
slowly and in a piecemeal  fashion over the past twenty years; but  its reform of ownership  in agriculture  took place
early in the reform process,  and was more widespread  and swifter in pace.  Starting in  1978, government allowed
the previously  collectivized  farmers  to  retain  and  sell  more  and more  of their  production  in  increasingly  free
markets.  By  the  early  1980s,  all  farmland  was  "de-collectivized,"  and  allocated  to  family  units,  a massive
privatization,  or  re-privatization,  process  affecting  800- million  people.  Not all prices  were  immediately  fully
freed, the state retained  a role  in marketing and credit at least until the early  1990s,  and one could not freely buy
and sell  the land allocated.  These  reforms were  revolutionary,  affecting  the lives of a populous sector,  still-in
1978-accounting  for 71 percent of employment in China.
SOE productivity  in  the industrial  sector  was increased  by gradually freeing  prices  and decentralizing economic
decision-making.  At  the  same time,  government  created forms  of industrial  ownership,  particularly  at the  sub-
national  level, that successfully  combined  elements of collective  and private property.  Latterly,  new private entry
and  foreign  direct  investment  were  permitted.  All of this  proved  efficacious  and  changed  China's  economic
landscape. In  1998, the non-state sector (including private agriculture)  accounted  for 62 percent of GDP, while the
share of SOEs in industrial output  declined from 78 percent  in 1978 to 28 percent in  1999.
Since  1987, there have been numerous privatizations of small collectively owned township and village enterprises,
and further experimentation  with  ownership  forms at the  local  level.  Small privatizations  created  management-
employee buyouts,  known  as "joint stock cooperatives":  Many of the resulting entities  were saddled  with  heavy
debt burdens,  excessive employment, and social obligations, and were thus non-viable;  in  1995, 72 percent of  such
firms were  in  the  red.  In  the  mid-1990s,  government tried  to  improve  their performance  by  creating  limited
liability  companies giving  managers  a larger  stake  (so as to hold  them accountable) and  through sales,  mergers,
and  takeovers  of SOEs by  private  firms.  Implementation  of the Bankruptcy  Law  also  led to  some  3,400  SOE
bankruptcies  since  1996.  But few outright sales of  medium or large SOEs were allowed.
In the last  few years,  as long-simmering  pressures  on the banking system  have grown acute,  the  government has
announced  its intent to clean up and privatize large SOEs.  Many such firms carved  out their better assets to set up
new companies  for  initial  public  offerings  on  the  stock  market  in  which  they  became  the  largest  controlling
shareholder.  There has been some  dilution of shares over time,  but mostly to other state entities with the majority
of shares  still  remaining  in state hands.  While  less  concentrated  ownership  has led  to private  takeovers  in  some
cases,  full  privatization  continues  to, move  at  a  slow  pace.  Most  Chinese  SOEs  being  overstaffed  and heavily
burdened  with  social  welfare  responsibilities,  authorities  are  reluctant  to  take  steps  that  would  result  in  large
layoffs,  add to unemployment,  and perhaps provoke  social tension.  They do not wish to move  in the absence of
severance and retirement  packages, unemployment  insurance  schemes  and training programs.  These take time to
build.  In the  interim,  for the  largest firms-both  in terms of turnover  and employees-the  Chinese  continue  to
search  for mid-way mechanisms  that will raise  profitability  and efficiency  without  full privatization.  Their own
experience  to date,  and the experience of many other countries  that followed  a similar path,  suggests that it will
not reap  the full benefits  from SQE reform  unless  it limits the state's role in  their operations.  Economic  reforms
coupled  with privatization would lead to even-greater-performance  improvements.
While  China's  SOE problems  grow increasingly  acute  (badloans of'SOEs  are, crippling the  commercial banks),
many  countries  in  transition  or  elsewhere" would  welcome  themz-if'they  could.be.assured  that  they would-be
accompanied  by  the  country's  impressive  growth  and,production  record.  The  Chinese  experience  shows  the
importance  and utility of policy pragmatism,  and the  maintenance of a capacity within the  state-to formulate  and
enforce the policies chosen.
Source:  Nolan, 1995;  International Finance Corporation, 2000; Zhang, 2001.6
12.  Foreign participation  as  a share  of total developing  country proceeds has been increasing
over the years, mostly as a result of sales in sectors such as oil and gas, telecommunications,  and
banking,  and largely in Latin America,  Eastern Europe, and East Asia. The foreign share reached
76 percent of total proceeds  and generated an estimated  $32 billion in foreign exchange  in 1999.
Foreign direct investment accounted for 80 percent, and portfolio investment for the rest.
13.  These  trends  in  privatization  activity  contributed,  along  with  new  private  entry,  to  a
substantial  decline  in the  relative  share  of SOE  value  added  in  GDP.  Sheshinski  and  Lopez-
Calva (1998)  show that the share of SOEs in industrialized countries declined from an average of
about 6  percent of GDP in  1980 to 5 percent  in  1997.  The decline  for low-income  countries is
steeper,  falling  from  a high point  of 15  percent  of GDP in  1980s  to  3 percent  in  1997,  while
middle-income  countries  also experienced  significant reductions  (Table  1).  Since the upper and
lower  middle-income  groups  include  the  transition  economies  of Central  and  Eastern  Europe,
this decline was  expected  given the high  levels of state  ownership to begin with and the use of
mass and rapid privatization techniques  in a number of these countries.
Table  1.  Change in SOE's Activity as a Percentage of GDP
(Decrease  In percentage points of GDP)
Countries  1980  1997  Change
(by Income  Groups)  (%)  (%)  (%)
Low Income  Countries  15  3  -12
Lower Middle Income Countries  11  5  -6
Upper Middle Income Countries  10.5  5  -5.5
High Income Countries  6  5  -1
Source:  Sheshinski  and Lopez-Calva,  1998.
3.  IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION
14.  Sufficient time has elapsed since the start of reforms to allow an initial  assessment of the
extent to which privatization  has met  its intended  economic  and financial benefits.  There are  to
date well  over  100  studies that do so, covering privatizations  in all  sectors through a variety of
methods in a large number of developed,  developing and transition countries (selected studies are
summarized  in  Annex  A).  The  impacts,  and  supporting  studies,  can  be  grouped  into  five
categories:
*  First,  most  assessments  of  privatization  have  looked  at  financial  and  operational
performance  at the  enterprise  level, comparing  productivity and profitability before  and
after  sale,  and changes  in  output,  investments,  capacity  utilization,  and the  like.  These
studies  provide  ample  evidence  that,  when  done  right,  privatization  improves
performance  in many different  settings in many different ways.
*  Second, there is a limited but growing body of work about the fiscal and macroeconomic
effects  of privatization  showing  positive  fiscal  benefits  and  a  high  correlation  between
privatization  and growth.7
*  Third,  the broader welfare and economic consequences of privatization  are not as widely
studied, though the  few rigorous  evaluations  show that privatization  has  done  well,  and
that the welfare  effects  when  compared  to realistic  counterfactuals  have  been  positive,
often substantially so.
*  Fourth, growing analysis  of the employment and broader labor market impacts shows that
privatization  does  not always  lead  to unemployment,  but that the  outcomes  are  mixed,
reflecting  country and  industry  differences.  When  evaluated  against  the  counterfactual,
privatization  has  often  led to  employment  increases  at both the enterprise  and industry
level.
*  Fifth,  the effects  of privatization on income and wealth distribution are the least studied
aspects  of  privatization-though  considerable  work  on  these  questions  is  now  in
progress.
(i)  Enterprise performance
15.  There  is  now  a  wealth  of information  from  a  wide  range  of  countries  showing  that
privatization  is  associated with improvements  in the firm's financial  and operating performance.
Following  privatization,  profitability  usually  increases,  often  substantially,  as does  efficiency
(expressed  as  real  sales  per  employee),  output,  and  investment.  These results  are  particularly
robust  for privatized  firms  operating  in  sectors  where  effective  competition  reigns,  such  as
manufacturing,  agro-industry,  oil and gas, and mining.  As summarized  below, these outcomes
are seen  in  cross-cutting  studies covering both developed and  developing  countries,  as well as
case studies of developing and transition economies.
Cross-cutting  studies
16.  Megginson and Netter (2001)  have carried out the most recent and thorough survey of the
studies  evaluating  empirically  the  impact  of privatization  on  firm  performance.  The  most
comprehensive  of these  (Megginson,  Nash  and  van Randeborgh,  1994;  Boubakri  and  Cosset,
1998;  D'Souza,  Nash  and Megginson,  2000)  use a similar methodology  to compare  pre-  and
post-privatization  financial  and operational  performance  measures  (over  three  year periods)  of
large  numbers  of  companies  privatized,  through  public  share  offerings,  in  developed  and
developing  countries.  As  summarized  in  Megginson  and Netter  (2001),  these studies  generate
similar results.  Weighted  averages of the mean values from the studies show that:  profitability,
defined  as net income  divided by  sales, increases  from an average value  of 8.6 percent  before
privatization  to  12.6 percent thereafter.  Efficiency,  defined  as real (inflation  adjusted)  sales per
employee,  increases from an average  of 96.9 percent  in the  year of privatization  to  an  average
level  of 123.3  percent  in the  post-privatization  period; between 79 and 86 percent  of firms see
output-per-worker  increases.  Most of the studies also conclude that there were economically  and
statistically  significant  post-privatization  increases  in output (real  sales),  as  well  as  significant
decreases  in  leverage.  Capital  investment  spending  slightly  increased,  while  employment
changes  are  ambiguous  (see  section  (iv) below  for  more  on employment).  The  main  factors
accounting  for the  performance  improvements  are  changes  in  the  incentive  and  management
structure coupled with improved corporate governance.8
17.  Sheshinski and  Lopez-Calva's  (1998)  evaluation  of the empirical  evidence also  supports
the view  that privatization  has  positive  effects  on enterprise  profitability  and efficiency.  They
found that:  (i)  privatized  firms improve  profitability after  sale  irrespective  of market  structure,
though  competitive  firms  show  higher  productivity  increases  compared  to  firms  in  more
concentrated markets.  In the latter, deregulation policies, which the authors relate to privatization
programs, are shown to speed up the convergence  process of firms to industry standards; and (ii)
fully privatized firms perform better than partially privatized firms. In their older, seminal  study,
Boardman  and  Vining  (1989)  provide  evidence  to  support  the  latter  finding.  Analyzing  the
performance  of the 500 largest non-U.S. industrial firms in  1983, they show that state-owned and
mixed ownership  enterprises  are significantly  less profitable  and  productive  than  are privately
owned  firms.  They  conclude  that  mixed  enterprises  are  no  more  profitable  than  SOEs,  and
suggest  that  full  private  control,  not  just  partial  ownership,  is  important  for  achieving
performance  improvements.
18.  It  can  be  argued  that  there  are  difficult  methodological  problems  with  cross-cutting
studies of the above mentioned type that might lead them to be biased in favor of privatization.
First, there is a problem of selection bias. Firms sold by public offering will be the "cream of the
crop;"  i.e.,  to meet  stock exchange  listing requirements  they will have been profitable for some
time, possess up to date and accurate accounts,  and in general  will be  the largest and among the
best performing  firms sold in the privatization program.  Thus there is the possibility that it is not
privatization  that  causes  performance  improvements,  but rather  it  is  that the  highest  potential
firms  are  privatized.  In  addition,  because  of data  limitations,  developed  countries  are  over
represented  in  the  samples  of such  studies,  leading  to  further  possible  selection  bias.  Second,
there are  data constraints  as well  that some argue  influence the findings.  Comparing accounting
information  across  different  countries and at different points in time  can be difficult  and fraught
with problems. Most of the studies  do not account for changes  in the macroeconomic  or business
environment  over the given time period, both of which influence  the outcomes of privatization,
and it could be argued that a rising economic tide lifted all firms, and not just the privatized ones.
And third,  using profitability  as  an indicator  of improved performance  is flawed  as  the private
sector  by  definition  is  profit  maximizing  while  profit  is not  likely  to  be a  goal  in the  public
sector.
19.  Despite these drawbacks,  these studies are the few that directly compare large samples of
firms  from a range  of industries and countries over different  time periods,  and they consistently
suggest  that  privatization  does  improve  firm  performance,  not just  in  terms  of profitability
changes  but  also  efficiency  improvements.  Moreover,  some  of the  methodological  drawbacks
have  been  addressed  in other  studies.  Boubakri  and  Cossett (1998),  for example,  analyzed  the
performance  of 79  newly privatized  firms  in  21  developing  countries  that experienced  full  or
partial  privatization  between  1980  and  1992.  The  sample  was  diversified,  with  wide
geographical  dispersion  and different  levels of country development,  and firms of different  size
and  in  different  industries  and  market  structures.  They  too  found  significant  increases  in
profitability  (up  on average  by  124 percent  after privatization),  operating  efficiency  (real  sales
per  employee  up  by 25  percent  on  average  and net  income per  employee  up  by  63  percent),
capital investment spending (up  126 percent),  and employment (up  1.3 percent),  and a decline in9
leverage  and  an  increase  in  dividends.  The  changes  in both  profitability  and  efficiency  were
larger for firms in middle-income countries than for those in low-income countries.
20.  One of the biggest issues in evaluating privatization,  both in the cross-cutting  studies  as
well  as the country studies  discussed below, lies in comparing the  outcome of privatization with
the counterfactual,  i.e.  what would have happened  in the absence  of privatization.  There  is the
possibility  that  performance  improvements  would  have  happened  without  a  change  of
ownership-if general  economic  conditions  improved  and boosted  all  firms,  or if public  sector
managers  and  owners  were  able  to  put  in  place  and  sustain  reform  measures.  Omran  (2001)
argues that this was the case in Egypt.  He reviewed indicators in privatized  and remaining state-
owned  firms  in  the  1990s,  and found that  all  firms  improved,  regardless  of ownership type-
concluding  that general  liberalization  was more important  than  privatization  in explaining  firm
behavior.  But it could also be argued that previous liberalizing reforms without privatization had
accomplished  little in Egypt; and that only when privatization  was a realistic option and credible
threat did remaining  SOE managers  take seriously the calls for reform.  Few studies  evaluate  the
counterfactual  in any systematic way,  the most notable being that of Galal,  Jones,  Tandon,  and
Vogelsang (1994); this study is discussed in further detail in section (iii) below.
21.  A final issue is one of timing, again applying to both cross-cutting and country/enterprise
level  studies.  Dewenter  and  Malatesta  (1997)  and  Hodge  (2000),  while  supportive  of the
positive  effects of privatization,  argue that  some of the performance  improvements  occur before
privatization  due to the "announcement"  effect, rather than to privatization  per se. True, many of
the  most difficult  reforms  have  often been  made  in  the run-up  to  privatization  but  in most of
these  cases  the  announcement  was  accompanied  by:  (i)  a  change  of management;  (ii)  large
layoffs  and  other  cost-cutting  measures;  and  (iii)  other  departures  from  previous  inefficient
procedures.  And  these  measures  were  implemented  with  the  clear  threat  of  privatization.
Moreover,  the  extent to which these improvements  could  have been  sustained  in the absence  of
eventual  divestiture is highly questionable,  and many have argued and there is evidence to show
that  privatization  was necessary  to  "lock-in"  the  gains  and  prevent  backsliding  (World  Bank,
1995).
Developing countries
22.  Most  (not  all)  of the  growing  body  of work  assessing  the  impact of privatization  in
developing  countries  shows  that  privatization  has  improved  enterprise  performance.  For
example,  La  Porta  and  Lopez-de-Silanes  (1997),  in  a  study  of  all  218  non-financial  firms
privatized  in  Mexico  in  the  period  1983-1991,  show  that  SOEs,  in  competitive  and  non-
competitive sectors,  went from being highly unprofitable before privatization  to being profitable
thereafter, closing the performance gap with control groups of similar firms in the private sector.
Output  (inflation  adjusted)  increased  54.3  percent,  sales  per  employee  roughly  doubled,  and
profitability  increased  by  24 percent.  Controlling  for  changes  in  the  macro  environment,  they
found that improvements  were due mainly to productivity gains resulting  from better incentives
and  management  associated  with  private  ownership,  and  partly  to  lower  employment  costs
resulting from labor reductions.I0
23.  In  Brazil,  privatization  improved  SOE  efficiency  and  profitability  (Macedo,  2000).
Between  1981  and  1994,  before the  start of the privatization  program,  SOEs performed  poorly.
The ratio  of profits  to net  assets during the period was, on  average,  a negative 2.5  percent, and
fell  to negative  5.4 percent towards the end.  Significant gains  were achieved after privatization;
for example,  the large steel mill (CSN) which had been incurring heavy losses became profitable
and  investments  increased  dramatically.  Higher  profits  are  bringing  more  tax  revenues  to
government,  and  the  company  began  paying  dividends  to  shareholders.  In  another  study,
Pinheiro  (1996)  analyzed  the  performance  of 50  Brazilian  SOEs before  and after  privatization
(using  a  methodology  similar  to  the  Megginson  studies).  He  concluded  that  privatization
significantly  improves  SOE  performance,  particularly  when  there is  a  change of control  rather
than  when  only a minority  stake  is sold.  The results  are  also  stronger  for  companies  that have
been recently sold,  indicating that privatization works better when combined with liberalization
measures,  including  removing  barriers  to  entry and  exit,  imposing  positive  interest  rates,  and
reducing access to budget resources  (for more on this point, see section 4 (ii) below).
24.  Most  success  stories  come  from  high  or middle  income  countries  but  privatization  has
yielded  positive  benefits  in  low-income  countries  faced  with difficult  market  conditions  and
wary  investors.  Privatized  companies  in  sub-Saharan  Africa  increased  capacity  utilization
through  new  investments,  introduced  new  technology,  and  expanded  their  markets  (Campbell
White  and  Bhatia,  1998).  In  Ghana,  sales  of privatized  firms  increased  by  71  percent;  in
Tanzania,  ten privatized firms made investments that were 2.5 times greater than  17 non-divested
companies.  A  separate  study  of pre-  and post-privatization  performance  of  16  African  firms
privatized  through  public  share  offering  during  1989-96  finds  a  significant  increase  in  capital
spending  by privatized  firms-but only insignificant  changes  in profitability,  efficiency,  output
and leverage (Boubakri and Cossett,  1999).
25.  Some governments have  in the past tried to raise revenues  or obtain support  by divesting
minority  stakes  through  share  issues,  to  state-controlled  financial  institutions  (in  India),  to
workers  (in  Egypt),  or  to  the  public  at  large  (Bangladesh  banks).  None  resulted  in  major
performance  changes.  In  general,  government  retention  of majority shares  has not  resulted  in
improved  firm performance.  The  problem  is  minimal  changes  in  the  corporate  governance  of
these  firms.  However,  partial  privatizations  in  Malaysia  yielded  positive  results  (Galal  et  al,
1994),  largely  because  through  commercialization  managers  were  made  more  responsive  to
market  pressures  and  because  private  shareholders  forced  government  to  shift  towards  more
economically rational  decisions.  Majority or full  sale of shares to strategic investors  avoids the
incentive  and  contracting  problems  associated with minority privatization.  Such  sales  can  and
have been  combined  with share sales to  employees  and the general  public  in an effort to share
the wealth and win popular support for privatization. This approach has worked well in a variety
of settings,  from Chile to Jamaica to Estonia.
26.  To  summarize,  empirical  evidence  from non-transition  economies  suggests  strongly that
privatization  has a beneficial  impact on enterprise  performance.  While there are  methodological
issues involved  in carrying  out impact  evaluations,  there is by now  sufficient  and  compelling
evidence  from  a  wide  range  of  countries  and  sectors  that  privatization  of  enterprises  in
competitive  markets  leads  to  significant  improvements  in  efficiency,  profitability,  output,  and
capital investment spending.Transition economies
27.  Assessing the impact of privatization  on enterprise performance is particularly difficult in
transition  economies;  the  concurrent  sweeping  economic  and  social  changes  make  it  more
difficult to separate privatization's  effects from other factors. Further, information  and analytical
shortcomings  are particularly  acute  in the  transition  economies,  and  especially  those  formerly
part  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Several  recent  assessments  are  beginning  to  overcome  these
difficulties.  They generally  show that privatization  has yielded positive effects-though  there  is
a marked difference between countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which includes the
Baltic states, and those of the former Soviet Union (FSU) (the Baltic states excluded).
28.  Djankov  and  Murrell  (2000)  have  conducted  the  most  comprehensive  and  rigorous
review  of  125  empirical  studies  of transition  economies.  Based  on  composite  evidence  that
reflects  the results of individual  studies, they conclude that there  is strong evidence  that private
ownership  produces  more restructuring  (changes  that prepare  a  firm to survive  and  thrive  in  a
competitive market  economy)  than  state ownership in just about  every transition  country.  But
sub-regional differences  are acute:  the privatization  effect  in CEE countries  is more than  twice
the size of that in FSU countries.
29.  One  explanation  for  the  varying  regional  results  is  the  type  of owners  produced  by
different  sales  methods.  CEE countries  (such as Estonia,  Hungary, and Poland)  that privatized
largely through trade sales on a case-by-case basis  ended up with concentrated  strategic owners,
often  foreigners,  who  have been  found  to be  much  more productive  than  diffused  domestic
owners. FSU countries  relying principally on mass privatization  through vouchers tended to have
less positive results.  Such methods  led to a large  amount of  insider ownership  by managers  and
employees,  and/or  widely  diffused  shareholding  among  small,  first  time  equity  holders.  Yet,
even in these cases,  there is little evidence  that privatization harmed firm performance,  with the
very important possible exception of one form of privatization  in Russia, where firms privatized
to workers  appear  to be  doing  even  worse  than  SOEs  (Box  2).  In  general,  privatized
companies  run by insiders are least efficient,  but even these  do better than  state-run companies,
although commercialized  enterprises  with changed management  and/or an  independent board of
directors  perform  somewhat  better  than  SOEs.  (Note  that  everywhere  in  transition  the  best
performers  of all  are  new private  entrants;  i.e.,  those  setting up  "greenfields"  operations  that
were never in state hands.)  Method of sale is not the whole of the  story; another important  part
of the  explanation  for  the  varying  regional  results  are  differences  in  levels  of institutional
development  and policy approaches  with respect to new  entry and hard budget constraints  (see
section 4 (ii) below).
30.  Another survey of outcomes of privatization  in transition was conducted by Havrylyshyn
and  McGettigan  (1999).  They  dispute  the  notion  that  ownership  change  is  not  central  for
restructuring  and  improved  firm performance,  and that  exposure  of firms  to  competition  and
hard budget constraints  is more important.  Their key findings are:  (i) private  enterprises almost
invariably outperform  state enterprises;  i.e.  any privatization  is better than none (note again  the
possible and important exception  of one form of insider privatization  in Russia to this finding),
but the form of privatization  matters as do pressures  of competition and hard budget constraints;12
and (ii)  new private companies  are the best performers,  followed by newly privatized  firms run
by outsiders  (local or foreign).
Box 2:  Russian Privatization
In Russia, over 70 percent of enterprises  became  insider owned  following voucher privatization in  1992-94.  The
hope and expectation was that these inside owners  would open their firms to outsiders  endowed with money and
expertise.  Newly formed investment  funds were expected  to assist in this process.  But insiders  proved reluctant
to give  up control,  and outside  investors were  in  any  case highly  wary  in the  deeply unsettled  and often lawless
circumstances.  As  a  result,  neither  new  investors  nor  Russian  investment  funds  succeeded  in  changing  and
concentrating  ownership  in  the  secondary  market.  The upshot  was  limited  restructuring.  Subsequent  and non-
transparent  cash sales of the larger enterprises  in Russia-the  notorious "loans-for-shares"  program-assisted  or
actually  created  a  "kieptocracy,"  meaning  many  high  potential  firms  were  transferred  to  a  small  group  of
investors at low prices (Black,  Kraakman  and Tarassova,  2000).  Some analysts  (Barberis,  Boycko, Shleifer, and
Tsukanova,  1996; Earle,  1998; Earle and Estrin,  1998) nonetheless conclude that privatization  led to performance
improvements  in Russia,  at least  in  firms  where  outsiders  succeeded  against  odds  in securing  control,  though
they  too acknowledge  that many of these new owners  did not pay  anything near a reasonable  price for the firms
obtained; and the sales methods were non-transparent..
What can  one  say with certainty  about  the difficult  and  complex  Russian  case?  It  is clear  that privatization,
competition  and hardening  of budget  constraints  all  improve  efficiency  in  Russia.  Increases  in  private  share
ownership  raises  real  sales per  employee,  while  subsidies  reduce  the  pace  of restructuring  (Djankov,  1999a).
Significant  foreign  ownership  (greater  than  30  percent),  is  positively  related  to  restructuring.  Managerial
ownership  is positively related  to restructuring  at low levels  (less than  10 percent)  and high levels of ownership.
Had  Russia  been  able  to  auction  off transparently  more  of its high  potential  assets to core,  preferably  foreign
investors, the economy would have been better off today, would probably have returned to positive growth earlier
than  it  did,  and  might  have  avoided  some  of the  acute  pain  suffered  by  large  elements  of the  population.
Whether or not that course of action was possible is hard to determine  even in retrospect
Two questions  ultimately  arise: (i) did privatization  lead to increased  efficiency?  and (ii) did  it lead to  increased
equity  and/or  welfare?  All  observers  agree  that  Russian  methods  of  privatization  dramatically  increased
inequity.  But what  was the  reasonable  alternative?  Continued  state ownership?  One  can  make  a  case that the
very corrupt  and unfair  "loans-for  shares"  privatizations  in  Russia eventually  resulted in increased  efficiency  in
the ftrms taken over.  How so?  The managers  put in place by the "oligarchs" are  showing themselves to be better
managers  than  those  provided  previously  by  the  state.  The  owners  and  managers  of these  firms  have  now
become-after  their  initial  and  unjust  acquisition  of  assets  and  some  years  of "wild  easf'  behavior-  more
interested  in profits and protecting  the long-run health of the assets through orderly and legally  regulated  market
behavior.  Recent  evidence suggests  that almost all the firms privatized  through loans  for shares are now  running
profits  and are much healthier  than  they  were  as SOEs.  True,  the present  owners  paid  very little  for these  very
high potential  assets,  meaning that  the state-and the taxpayers-obtained  very little in  the transfer.  Moreover,
the  experience  soured  the  Russian  public  on  reform,  privatization,  and  the  honesty  and  competence  of both
officials and the private sector in general.
The overall point is that Russian privatization should ideally have been better managed, and that the manner in
which much of it was carried out entailed  high social and political costs, the ramifications of which are still being
worked  out.  Nonetheless, to conclude that Russia  should not have privatized,  that it should have retained a mass
of firms in state hands while it tried to reform slowly and create an institutional setting more conducive  to decent
transactions,  may well have been an unrealistic  alternative,  as evidenced by the poor and unsustainable records of
Belarus and Uzbekistan-countries that tried the "go slow" approach.
Source:  Nellis, forthcoming13
31.  In  the main,  the  economic  and financial  effects  of privatization  in  transition  have  been
positive.  As elsewhere,  private  owners  in transition  are  more  efficient  and  effective  than the
state.  There are some caveats to this conclusion,  but on average,  the finding is robust.  One need
only  look  at  those  transition  countries  that  have  delayed  or  avoided  privatization  (and  other
reform) to see the limits of the alternative  approach.  However,  the vast scope and rapid pace of
privatization  in  transition-much  of  it  taking  place  in  countries  with  ineffective  public
administrations,  weak  legal  systems,  and  embryonic  regulatory  capacities,  particularly
concerning  financial  and  capital  markets-led  to  much  corruption,  injustice,  asset-grabbing,
insider  trading,  and  defrauding  of minority  shareholders,  particularly  those  who  had obtained
their shares in give-away,  voucher schemes.  This has proven costly socially and politically.  In
sum,  the  shift  to  private  ownership  was  necessary,  but  it  should  ideally  have  been  better
managed.
(ii)  Macroeconomic  and fiscal effects
32.  Recent work on the fiscal and macroeconomic  effects of privatization  (Davis,  Ossowski,
Richardson,  and  Barnett,  2000)  indicates  large,  significant  and  positive  benefits  from
privatization.  Governments  tend  to  be  financially  better  off  after  privatization  than  before.
Proceeds  from privatization have been substantial, amounting  to 2 percent of GDP in a sample of
18  countries  reviewed.  The  fiscal  situation  tends  to  improve  over  time,  as  receipts  of
privatization  are  saved  rather  than  spent.5 Privatization  produces  positive  impacts  upon
government  revenue  by  means  other  than  sales  proceeds.  Transfers  decline  substantially
following privatization (Figure 3) and broader indicators of consolidated SOE accounts for some
countries indicate a large decline in deficits.
Figure 3:  Gross Budgetary Transfers and  Subsidies to
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'Excludes  Petr6leos  Mexicanos.  Includes some decentralized govemment agencies.
Source:  Davis, Ossowski, Richardson and Bamett,  2000.
5 Most of the countries  covered in the study had an IMF  program in place,  and consequent  limitations on the deficit
may have influenced  this finding.14
33.  In  terms  of growth,  private  firms  are  found  to be  more  efficient  than  state  enterprises,
especially  in  competitive  industries.  A  range  of policy  variables-fiscal  discipline,  price  and
trade liberalization,  deregulation,  privatization, clarification  of property rights-are important for
determining  growth.  Taken  individually,  they  may have  only  a  limited  effect  on  growth,  but
together  they  are  strongly  associated  with  rapid  expansion.  The  data  for  the  developing  and
transition  case  study  countries  in  the  IMF  study  support  these  findings,  showing  a  strong
correlation  between  growth and privatization.  While  privatization  alone  is not the cause  of the
increases  in growth rates in the study, it is likely that privatization serves as a proxy for the range
of structural  reform  measures.  The  study also  shows  that privatization  is  viewed by investors
and  markets  as  the  principal  signal  of reform  credibility  and  seriousness,  a  less  tangible  but
important macroeconomic  effect.
34.  Sheshinski  and  Lopez-Calva  (1998)  also  find  that  privatization  improves  the  public
sector's  financial  health.  Budget  deficits  decline  during  the  reform  period.  Low-income
countries which  are  less  aggressive  privatizers  have  a  more  significant  deficit  on average.  In
high-income  and  middle-income  countries,  privatization  reduces  the net transfers  to  SOEs,  and
the  transfers  become  positive  when  the  government  starts  collecting  taxes  from  privatized
firms-another  contributor  to positive macro  effects.  In most cases, the  post-sale taxes  are  far
more than the pre-sale dividends, if indeed any dividends were ever paid.  Despite concerns about
the  difficulties  of  tax  collection,  there  is  evidence  of  increased  downstream  revenues  to
governments  through higher taxes,  in, for example  Africa  (Campbell  White and  Bhatia,  1988),
Brazil  (Macedo,  2000),  Argentina  (Shaikh,  1996),  and Mexico (La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes,
1997).
35.  An  important  macroeconomic/fiscal  issue  in  privatization  is  the  use  of proceeds.  The
more the net proceeds  (that  is, gross  proceeds  minus the costs  of sales, which include  financial
clean-up,  severance costs, advisory costs) are devoted to retiring debt, both domestic  and foreign,
the  better,  as  it  stimulates  widespread  economic  benefits.  If the  proceeds  are  large  and  the
amount of debt retired significant,  this application helps  lower interest rates,  reduces  borrowing
and inflation,  and boosts overall  growth.  Four countries  covered  in the  IMF study-Argentina,
Egypt,  Hungary  and Mexico-had  an  initial  stock  of registered  public  debt  ranging  from  40
percent to  130 percent of GDP. The use of privatization proceeds,  along with other factors,  led to
a sharp decline in the debt between the year before the period of most active privatization and the
last  year  of active  privatization,  and  contributed  to  the  strengthening  and  stabilization  of the
economy.  The problem  is that there are many other claimants  to the proceeds,  and governments
are  sometimes  obliged  to  balance  the  economic  ideal  with  the  politically  feasible.  Many
governments  (Bolivia,  Estonia,  Hungary)  have  devoted  a portion of the proceeds  for covering
pension costs  (though they are a form of debt retirement since they are obligations of the state),
or-a risky one-to the restructuring  of some key SOEs prior to or even instead of privatization
(Czech  Republic).  Experience  cautions  against  the  use  of  proceeds  to  finance  current
expenditures  given the  temporary  and  one-time  nature  of  proceeds  and  the risk that spending
may become entrenched at unsustainable levels.15
(iii)  Welfare  consequences
36.  Studies  that  examine  the  impact  of privatization  on  enterprise  perfornance  contain
limited, if any, discussion of the effects  of the sale on  actors other than owners, or those outside
the  firm,  in  particular  consumers.  Since  most  of  the  evidence  indicates  improved  internal
efficiency  and higher returns  to owners  following privatization,  there  is  an implicit  assumption
that the economic welfare of society in general  has been made better off by the privatizations.
37.  But the welfare  improvements are implied only, and not proven,  even  in countries  where
numerous privatizations have consistently yielded better firm performance and increased benefits
to  the  shareholders.  It  is possible  for  a transaction  to  benefit  a  firm  and  its  owners while  not
affecting  or, worse,  decreasing  the total amount  of benefits  available  to  all affected actors,  and
the  society  at  large.  The  standard  example  is the  privatization  of an  inefficient  public  sector
monopoly to  a private  and unregulated  owner.  The result could  and  almost  certainly  would be
increased  firm profitability,  higher returns  to the new shareholders,  even perhaps higher  salaries
for workers  and expanded job opportunities,  and greater returns to government.  However,  these
gains could be  outweighed by the "welfare  losses" that might be imposed on consumers  and the
economy  as  a whole  due to  inadequate  access  or sub-optimal  supply of products  and  services
and/or  their excessively  high  price.  In  such  cases,  the  overall  welfare  consequences  could  be
negative.
38.  Determining the broader welfare gains and losses among  all affected actors-consumers,
government,  buyers,  workers,  competitors-is  a complex  and  exacting  exercise,  requiring  the
comparison  not simply of what happened  before  and after  the sale,  but also  the  comparison  of
what happened  after the sale to a "counterfactual"  case-that is, an  estimate of what would have
happened  had the firm stayed in state hands.  This approach  demands  an enormous  amount of
information  about  firm  performance  before  and  after the  privatization,  requires  highly  skilled
analysts, and  is subject to considerable  debate as to the realism of the counterfactual.  It has thus
successfully and rigorously been carried  out in only a few cases, mostly, though not exclusively,
involving infrastructure  firms.
39.  Most notable  is the seminal  study by Galal,  Jones, Tandon,  and Vogelsang  (1994).  Their
study of the welfare consequences  of privatization in  12 mostly infrastructure  enterprises  in four
developed and middle-income countries provides evidence of privatization's  effects on enterprise
efficiency, on subsequent investment,  and on consumer welfare. They examine the impact on all
actors  and  compare  performance  before  and  after  privatization,  as  well  as  the  "after"
performance  to  a  hypothetical  scenario  of continued,  and  reformed,  state  ownership.  Unlike
many other  analyses,  they also  isolate the effects  of privatization  from other broader economic
and sectoral changes.  They found that  divestiture substantially improved  economic welfare in 11
of  the  12  cases  (the  exception  being  Aeromexico),  mainly  due  to  a  dramatic  increase  in
investment,  improved  productivity,  more  rational  pricing  policies,  and,  importantly,  increased16
competition  and effective  regulation  (Figure 4).6  Despite  assuming  that public managers  would
adopt  new  technology  and  more rational  procedures  they  also  concluded  that privatized  firm
performance was superior to the alternative of continued state ownership.
Figure 4:  Welfare  Effects of Selling State-owned  Enterprises
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Source: Galal,  Jones, Tandon  and Vogelsang. 1994.
40.  Perhaps due  to the complexity of the approach,  and the  lack of reliable  data and skilled
analysts,  there  has  been  but  a  single  application  of the  welfare  methodology  in  low-income
countries.  One of the  originators  of the  method,  Jones,  along  with Jammal  and Gokur (1998),
applied  it to  81  privatizations in C6te d'Ivoire,  covering not just infrastructure  firms but a range
of firms  already operating  in competitive  markets  (in agriculture,  agro-industries,  tradable  and
non-tradable sectors). For the entire privatized sector, they concluded that there were substantial
benefits:  (i)  the  firms  performed  better after privatization;  (ii)  they performed  better than they
would have  had  they remained  under  public  ownership;  and  (iii)  the  set  of transactions  as  a
whole contributed positively to economic welfare, with annual  net welfare  benefits equivalent to
about  25  percent  of pre-divestiture  sales.  These  results  stemmed  from  a  number  of effects,
including  increases  in  output,  investment,  labor  productivity,  and  intermediate-input
productivity.
41.  All  in  all,  the  broader  welfare  consequences  of  privatization,  and  how  "fair"  a
privatization  transaction  or program  is perceived  to be by the  most affected  segments  or indeed
the general population of a country,  is critical  to its acceptance  and success.  More studies of the
welfare consequences  type are needed.
6  Aeromexico  was  sold  to a buyer  who  made  a number of unwise  decisions,  and  lost  a lot of money  before  the
company was sold and eventually  turned around.  This illustrates the point that private managers  make mistakes just
as public ones  do, but under private ownership  losses  are limited  by bankruptcy  and  restructuring,  whereas under
public ownership such losses are tolerated indefinitely.  This point is discussed in greater detail  in Jones,  Jammal and
Gogkur,  1998.17
(fv)  Employment  effects
42.  Stale  enterprises  tend  to  be  overstaffed,  sometimes  severely  so  as  governments  used
them for purposes  of employment  generation  and maintenance.  Some  examples:  in  Sri Lanka,
average  redundancy  in eight  of the largest fims (electricity,  railways,  shipping,  sugar,  cement
and petroleum) was 53 per cent (Salih, 2000); state-owned  Air Afrique has 4,200 employees and
eight aircraft, while industry leader, and privately owned, Ryan Air maintains a staff of 1,400  for
21  planes;  prior  to privatization,  Argentine  railways  employed  over  90,000 people  and  had a
wage  bill  equivalent  to  160%  of the  firmn's  total revenues.  Many similar examples  could  be
given.  These levels of overstaffing contributed  to the financial  weakness of SOEs.  Excess labor
is one of t1e first cost areas  addressed either by reforming governments  or new private owners.
The  saliency  of the  issue  has  led  to widespread  concern  that privatization  inevitably  leads  to
unemployment  and  loss  of benefits;  this in tum has sparked  opposition  to  privatization  from
trade unions, workers, and academics.
43.  The view that privatization  always  leads to layoffs  is unfounded.  True, highly protected
and  deeply  politicized  enterprises  have  seen  significant  declines  in  net  employment,  usually
before but also after privatization:  80, 72, and 50 percent respectively in Argentina's railways,
petroleum,  and electricity enterprises;  82 percent in Brazil railroads;  42 percent in Manila water;
50 percent in a study of Mexican firms.  Moreover, while D'Souza and Megginson's  2000 study
of 78 privatized firms in 25 countries found insignificant employment declines for the group as a
whole, there  were  significant reductions  in a  sub-group of non-competitive  firms.  The bulk of
these  reductions  occurred  largely  in  the  run  up  to  privatization  as  governments  prepared
enterprises  for  sale;  in a  few  cases they were  accompanied  by further  reductions  by  the new
owners/concessionaires.  But  much  of this  shedding  was  due  to  the  need  for  restructuring
irrespective of privatization  and to general  economic  conditions  rather than privatization per se
(Box 3).
Box 3:  Privatization and Employment in C6te d'Ivoire
Jones, Jamal and  Gogkur (1998),  in their study  of COte d'lvoire, analyzed  the effects  of privatization on  labor.
They found that the privatized sector as a whole indeed shed labor prior to privatization. But it shed less than the
economy  as  a  whole,  suggesting  that  layoffs  were  a  response  to  weak  economic  conditions  rather  than  to
divestiture  itself.  In fact, they  argue that privatization  may have reduced labor  shedding, possibly to mininize
labor  opposition  to  privatization.  Moreover,  the privatized  sector  maintained  Ivoran employment  unchanged
through  1994,  and in this regard  did sipificantly  better than  enterprises as a whole.  In privatized  firms,  total
employment  increased by an average of 3.9  percent per year after pTivatization  while  falling by 1.9  percent  per
year  before privatization,  which meant that tue  firms added  an average  of 741 jobs per year  after privatization
while  shedding  456 jobs per year  prior to  it. The  authors  believe  that  it would  have  risen still more without
privatization,  because, as profitabilty  returned  after the recession,  the public  sector would have reveited  to its
previous  habit  of over-employment.  Looking  at  employee  compensation,  real  wages  per  worker  and  total
employee  compensation  per worker  grew  at an  annual  rate  of 8.5  percent  and  6.8  percent  respectively  after
privatizadon  while  falling  i-n  the years  before;  and  there  was wage  convergence  between  the  lowest paid and
highest paid workers.
Source. Jonus, Jwnal,  and Gogur,  1998.18
44.  In  contrast, competitive  firms with relatively efficient pre-privatization staffing levels, as
well  as  firms  in high growth  sectors  such as  telecommunications,  have  frequently  experienced
slight if any decline  in employment.  Often they have  been  sold with their labor  force  intact to
private buyers who judged that they could employ all  previously existing workers,  or they were
willing to take on surplus  labor that they estimated  could  be absorbed by  new investments  and
expansion.  New  investments  and  growth  post-sale  in  fact  increased  employment  in  a  good
number of privatized  firms (Galal, Jones, Tandon,  and Vogelsang,  1994;  Megginson,  Nash, and
van Randenborgh,  1994;  Boubakri  and Cosset,  1998; Kikeri,  1998).  In a study of East European
countries,  the overall  level  of employment  declined prior to  and  at privatization,  but  increased
over  time (Estrin  and  Svejnar,  1998).  In  a  review  of 17  privatizations,  Van  der Hoeven  and
Sziracki  (1997)  found job  increases  in  four  (averaging  23  percent)  and  no  change  in  six; job
losses  occurred  in  seven  cases  (averaging  a substantial  44 percent  of the  pre-sale  workforce),
though  these involved  highly overstaffed  enterprises  in protected sectors  such as  tobacco, water
supply, and electricity.
45.  Moreover,  in many instances,  and contrary to popular perception,  those who retain their
jobs in privatized firms receive higher wages, sometimes  substantially so.  In Brazil,  employment
reductions  were  sizable  in  large  firms  privatized  in  the  1990s  (48  percent  on  average);  but
resulting  productivity  improvements  from  restructuring  meant  higher wages  and performance-
based  incentives  for  workers  who  remain  (Macedo,  2000).  Similar  evidence  is  also  seen  in
Mexico  (La  Porta  and  Lopez-de-Silanes,  1997),  Argentina  (Ramamurti,  1997),  and  Malaysia
(Galal et al, 1994).
46.  Critical perceptions notwithstanding,  privatization  does not appear to be  a main cause  of
perceived  overall  increases  in unemployment  and  wage  differentials.  Data  from  Argentina,  for
example,  suggests  that privatization  was  not a  major  contributor  to  the  rise  in unemployment
between  1993  and  1995,  but  the  "Tequila  Effect"-the  interest  rate  shock-was  (Chisari,
Estache,  Romero,  1999).  In  the  early  1990s  in Poland  and  Hungary,  despite  the  slow  pace  of
privatization,  official  unemployment  grew rapidly,  reaching  16.7  percent  in Poland  in  1993-94
(down  to  9.6  percent  in  1998),  and  14.1  in  Hungary-another  cautious  privatizer  at  the
outset-in  1993  (down  to  10.8  in  1996);  lack  of rapid  and  mass  privatization  thus  did  not
prevent large unemployment  increases  (Nellis,  1999). Most persuasively,  Behrman, Birdsall  and
Szekely (2000), in an econometric  study of the impact of liberalizing economic reforms on wage
differentials  in  Latin America,  concluded  that privatization  was negatively correlated  with such
increases.  That is, privatization  per se  did not contribute  to the growing wage  inequality seen in
reforming  Latin  American  economies.  Rather,  privatization  actually  was  mitigating  the
"disequalizing  effects"  of liberalizing  reform  in the  financial  sector, the  tax regime,  and capital
markets.  (This paper  also indicates  that the  largest relative job  losses  due to  privatization  are
found  in  the middle  management  ranks, and  not in  the  classic  blue  collar positions,  a finding
encountered in other regions.)
47.  The  overall  point  is  that  the  success  or  failure  of a  privatization  program  cannot  be
measured  simply on the basis  of whether  the post-sale  employment levels  in the  affected firms
match those of the  pre-sale period.  Much  of the  shedding  is due to  the  need  for restructuring
irrespective  of privatization  and to  general  economic  conditions.  Privatization  must also  be
viewed as part of an overall reform program that stimulates competition,  growth and productivity19
in  the  economy,  including  in  parts  of the  economy  that were  never  under  state  control  and
ownership.  When  properly  carried  out,  privatization  and  the  accompanying  reforms  lead  to
employment  gains  elsewhere  in  the  economy  as  unproductive  labor  is  released  for  more
productive  activities.  This  can and  should  far  outweigh  the  losses  suffered  in the  privatized
firms.  Continued  government  support  for state  enterprises  and their employees benefits  a small
number  of citizens  and comes  at the  expense  of society  as  a whole.  Rapid privatization  and  a
focus  on  creating  productive jobs through  the private  sector-rather than  on preserving jobs in
less  efficient areas-are  important for securing economy wide growth.
(v)  Wealth and income distribution
48.  The  question  of privatization's  effects  on  wealth  and  income  distribution,  a subject  of
intense  public  debate and many assertions  and claims,  is only recently receiving the concerted
attention of analysts. Knowledge of this issue is evolving, and the initial  findings are as follows.
49.  First,  studies (cited  above)  that have  measured the  welfare  consequences  conclude  that
privatization  generally increases the total resources  available in the economy.  Second, the same
studies  conclude  that while  a few privatizations  result  in welfare  gains for  all  the relevant  and
interested  actors  and  stakeholders  (sellers,  buyers,  consumers,  workers  and competitors),  many
produce gains for some and losses for others, depending on how the transaction is structured, and
the  level  of  institutional  development  and  competence  in  the  economy.  For  example,
government  sellers  often  underprice  shares  of SOEs  in order  to  ensure  that the  sale  proceeds
swiftly and  successfully,  and that lower income  first-time shareholders  are not priced out of the
market.  This results in gains for the shareholders,  new or otherwise,  but often constitutes a loss
for the seller-and  the  taxpayers.  Third,  the income  distribution  effects  of the  privatization  of
infrastructure  firms  have  been  shown to  depend  crucially  on the  fairness  and  capacity  of the
regulatory  system  put  in  place  prior  to  or  at  the  time  of the  transaction  (Chisari,  Estache,
Romero,  1999).
50.  The  most  salient  aspects  of the  distribution  issue  are  employment,  access,  price  and
ownership  effects.  The  effects of privatization  on employment,  both in the privatized  firms and
in the  economy at large,  are discussed  in section  (iv)  above.  Regarding  access,  recent work in
infrastructure  (covered  in detail  in the  separate  background  paper  on infrastructure,  see  Gray
2001)  points  to  a  highly  positive  impact  from  privatization,  as  increased  investment  leads  to
expansion,  and  as  sales  contracts  often  require  that this  expansion  be  aimed  at  least partly  at
previously  unfavored  groups  or regions.  Prices,  as  noted,  often  rise  following privatization  to
offset below cost tariffs, but the effects  on distribution are often muted or skewed by regulatory
frameworks  aimed  at  protecting  the  less  favored  (for  example,  the  Government  of  Chile
subsidized  telephone  costs  in  rural  regions).  Determining  whether  the  gains  from  access  are
more  or less  than the  losses  from price increases  is  a primary objective  of current  research  (see
for example, Torero and Pasco-Font, 2001).
51.  Finally,  despite  innovations  aimed  at  spreading  equity  holdings-such  as  voucher
schemes  in  transition  economies,  "capitalization"  in Bolivia,  and the  awarding  or  selling  of
shares  to workers  in privatized  firms-there  is  a widespread  perception,  even  among observers
sympathetic  to divestiture, that the effects of privatization  on wealth and ownership  may prove to20
be negative  in  distribution terms,  at  least  in the  short  run,  in the  sense that the upper income
categories will gain  far more  in equity shares than those in the lower income  deciles. However,
almost no  rigorous  analysis  of this question  has  yet been  completed,  and  one  must await  the
conclusion of some research efforts presently underway.7
4.  FACTORS  FOR SUCCESSFUL PRIVATIZATION
52.  Privatization  is neither a simple  nor a uniform process.  Starting points  differ;  countries
have varying objectives,  face  a wide and shifting range of problems and obstacles,  and thus need
to  adopt  different  strategies  and tactics  to  achieve  their  privatization  objectives.  There  is  no
universally  applicable  approach  to  privatization,  and the  attempt  to  apply a  "one  size fits  all"
approach  has  proven  ineffective  and  counterproductive.  Nonetheless,  worldwide  experience
does provide some guidance on the factors critical to the success of privatization.
(i)  Commitment and ownership
53.  Privatization requires  strong political  commitment. Privatization  is almost never painless.
Most  transactions  produce  winners  as  well  as  losers  (though  "win-win"  situations  occur
frequently).  Privatized  firms  sometimes  fail  and  go  out of business.  Significant  redundancies
have  been  involved.  And  often,  assets  must be  sold  at  less  than  book  value  which,  though
economically  justified,  leads  to  allegations  of giveaways.  The  fact  that the  gains  are usually
diffused and  in the longer-term  while the costs  are short-term  and borne, or appear to be borne,
by organized  and vocal groups,  such as labor, leads to an intense politicization of the issue.  This
requires  careful handling from the political  and administrative  leadership  to explain alternatives,
build  coalitions  for  change,  and deal  with the  disaffected.  All  this  in  turn  requires  high-level
decisions  on to whom to sell assets,  at what prices,  under what terms  and conditions,  and  with
what arrangements  to bring the  general  citizenry  and the  directly  affected parties  on board.  As
the experience  of countries  such as Argentina,  Bolivia,  the  Czech Republic, Mexico  and others
shows,  resolving  these questions necessitates  good  technicians  and dealmakers,  fully backed by
sustained and dedicated  commitment from the top in tackling the numerous vested  interests that
threaten to slow or derail the process.
54.  While necessary,  top-level political commitment alone is not however sufficient either for
privatization  to  take  place,  or  for  it  to  be  successful.  The  building  of  widespread  public
understanding,  if not active support,  for this intensely political  process  among a larger group  of
stakeholders  is  also  essential.  In  this  regard,  the  availability  of information  is  key.  Many
countries  have  found public  information  campaigns  to  be  helpful,  as  they  can  explain:  (i)  the
very large  and usually hidden financial  and economic  costs of unreformed  SOEs; (ii) the direct
and  indirect benefits  of privatization;  and  (iii)  address  the  principal  fears  and concerns  of the
citizenry regarding privatization.  Such campaigns  are particularly effective  when combined with
7  At least  three  research  projects  are presently  underway  to  look  at  various  aspects  of the  distribution  effects  of
privatization:  the  first  at  the  Inter-American  Development  Bank,  focusing  on  Latin  America;  the  second  at  the
Center  for Global Development  in Washington  D.C.,  looking  at  the  question  in  a wide  range of developing  and
transition  economies;  and the  third  at  WIDER  in  the United  Nations  University.  All  expect  to provide  results in
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mechanisms  to  ensure  broad-based  participation  and  mitigate  political  and  social  costs  (e.g.
procedures  for transparency,  labor programs,  share ownership programs  in firms being sold; see
below).  Explaining  the  objectives  and  strategy  of the  privatization  program  itself also  helps
create  greater acceptance  and ownership among key stakeholders.
55.  The  experience  of countries  such  as  Russia-where,  at  the  outset,  far  too  much  was
promised  of privatization,  making  the  subsequent  disappointments  even  less  tolerable-show
that such campaigns  are not always easy to implement and that successful  efforts require a clear
and  well-thought  out  strategy,  flexibility  in  implementation,  sufficient  attention  to  local
conditions,  and the importance of building-in genuine  feedback mechanisms. Most important,  the
promises  usually  made  in  these  campaigns-that  good  assets  will  be  sold  in  an  open,
competitive,  transparent  manner-have  to  be  kept.  The  key  is  to  have  a  public  information
program, not just a public relations campaign.
(ii)  Ownership and competition
56.  After  20  years of privatization  experience,  there  is  still vigorous  debate  concerning  the
extent  to  which  ownership  matters.  Economic  theory  is  somewhat  agnostic  on  the  effects  of
ownership; it regards market structure  and the degree to which a firm is subject to competition of
equal  or greater importance.  In terms of empirical  evidence,  since privatization  is normally one
component  in a larger set of liberalizing,  competition-enhancing  reforms,  some think that it may
be the increased  exposure to competition  that accounts  for most of the positive  changes  seen in
privatized firms.8 Indeed, some cases indicate that competition is more important than ownership
change in bringing about efficiency gains.9
57.  At the same time, if competition and market restructuring  are so efficacious on their own,
the  question  is why they so  rarely occur in the  absence of ownership  change.  Indeed,  the poor
experience with SOE reform in the 1980s and before  shows the difficulties  and limited results of
reforms short of ownership change.  Despite  concerted and varied efforts to introduce competitive
and  other  reforms,  SOEs  proved  stubbornly  resistant  to  change.1 0 This  was  not  because  the
solutions to SOE problems  were not known.  Rather  it was because of governments'  inability or
unwillingness  to apply  fully the needed package  of reforms (e.g.,  expose  SOEs to competition,
require  them  to  access  private  capital  markets  for  investment  funds,  create  a  market  for
managers,  etc.),  or to  leave  the  package  in place  for sufficient  time to  change  incentives  and
behaviors.  Even  in cases where performance  may have improved (China being a rare case,  see
Box  1),  reforms  did  not  endure  and  backsliding  occurred,  usually  due  to  renewed  political
interference  (World  Bank,  1995;  Majumdar,  1996;  Shirley  and  Xu,  2000).  In  particular,
governments  could almost never bring themselves  to allow insolvent and even bankrupt  SOEs to
8  Tandon  (1995)  argues:  "...there  are,  of course,  many  cases  where  privatization  appears  to  have  'resulted'  in
efficiency  improvement;  in most  of these cases,  however,  the privatization  appears  to have  been  contemporaneous
with deregulation or other types of competition-enhancing  measures."
9 In  reviewing  the  liberalization  and  privatization  of the  British  electricity  sector,  Newberry  (1999)  argues  that
"...competition rather  than privatization  improved performance...."  He  shows that in those  parts of the  sector  that
were  privatized  but  not  liberalized,  or  as  liberalized  as  other  parts  of the  system,  the  efficiency  gains  were
considerably less.
10  The  range  of reforms short  of ownership  change  are summarized  by  Shirley,  1983  and in Nellis  and  Shirley,
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fail and go out of business.  Instead, soft budgets continued.  Where direct transfers were reduced,
they were often  replaced by government  guarantees  and concessionary  credits  from the banking
sector.  Indirect support through deferment of tax payments, dividends,  and custom duties was the
norm.  In  the  absence of  exit options,  there were  few meaningful  pressures  and  incentives  on
government officials, managers,  and workers to reform.
58.  Shirley and Walsh (2000)  analyze  and sum up the ownership debate based on a review of
some  50  empirical  studies  covering  a  variety  of  countries  and  sectors  (competitive  and
noncompetitive).  They found greater  ambiguity about ownership  in theory than in the empirical
literature,  the  latter being  skeptical  of SOEs  as  a tool to  address market failures  for the reasons
outlined  above.  The majority of empirical  studies  conclude that privatized-and private-firms
perform better than SOEs, a finding that is robust across all sectors  and market structures.  Better
private performance  is  evident  in both developed  and  developing  countries;  while a few studies
show better public performance  in developed  countries  in  infrastructure  sectors,  in  developing
countries there  are no  studies  where  SOEs  do better  in  any sector  or market  situation.  Private
firms do better  in fully competitive  markets.  This advantage  persists but  is less pronounced  in
monopolistic markets  where the evidence  is less conclusive;  however,  no studies  in developing
countries find that public ownership does better in potentially competitive  industries.
59.  The difficulties  of SOE  reform  and  the  substantial  empirical  evidence  on privatization
strongly  supports  the  importance  of  ownership.  Ownership  change  is  needed  to  make
competition  effective.  But competitive  markets  are also  important if privatized-and private-
firms are to perform well.  Privatization  realizes  its full potential when competition  is promoted.
Competition means  free  entry and the freedom  to fail. Privatization  allows inefficient  firms that
cannot  compete-and  that  would  otherwise  have  been  kept  alive-to  fail.  Removing  these
barriers  to exit also  means  removing barriers  to entry.  Private firms will not  enter if inefficient
firms are  not allowed  to  fail  and if there  is no  level  playing field.  Subsidizing  such firms  and
keeping  them  in  operation  also  makes  it  harder  for private  firms to  access  credit  and to  enter
markets.  The  issue  is  thus  not  one  of privatization  vs.  competition.  Privatization  and  pro-
competition policies are in fact complements that are mutually reinforcing.
60.  Thus,  alongside  privatization of existing  assets,  removing  entry  barriers  is  key  for  the
development  of dynamic  and  competitive  private  sectors.  In  tradable  sectors,  this  involves
simplifying procedures  and  licenses required to  start and register a business,  eliminating  import
restrictions, and deregulating pricing.  In infrastructure,  maximum economic benefits are realized
when  privatization  is  combined  with  new  entry,  the  break  up  of  large  entities,  and  price
deregulation  with development of regulatory  frameworks.  Galal  et al  (1994)  show that,  while
ownership  matters,  competitive  markets  reinforce  the  benefits  of private  ownership.  Divesting
into competitive markets may reduce the revenues  from sale, but efficiency,  not revenues, should
be the primary objective of privatization.
61.  Removal  of entry barriers  is particularly  important  in transition  economies  where state
enterprises  dominated  all markets  and where legal and other restrictions  on private  participation
and entry were powerful  (Box 4).  For example,  in Poland,  privatization  of large  SOEs initially
proceeded  slowly  (though  most  small  firms  were  quickly  sold  off).  However,  entry  was
permitted  and  vigorously  encouraged,  and  harder  budgets  were  imposed  on  most  SOEs  that23
remained.  Competition  increased  in  all  sectors  of  the  economy,  and  asset  stripping  was
minimized.  Thus,  when  it  was  finally  decided  to  privatize  the  larger  enterprises,  there  was
something  left  to  sell,  and market  conditions  were  generally  competitive-all  of which  led  to
positive  outcomes. China's  success is also in good part due to opening  entry to domestic quasi-
private enterprises  and to foreign investors.  In changing  the public-private mix, privatization was
for long less important than the emergence of new private businesses.
Box  4:  Is Ownership Change Enough?
Sachs,  Zinnes, and Eil'at (2000) examine the emnpirical  evidence  across 24 transition  economies and conclude that
ownership alone is not enough to generate economic performance  improvements.  It is when ownership change is
combined  with  institutional  reforms-aimed  at  removal  of barriers  to  entry  and  exit,  improving  prudential
regulation  and  corporate  governance,  hardeniing. budget  constraints,  and  developing  capital  markets-that  one
sees large  and enduring progress.
Maximum  impact  is  produced  when  market  competitiveness,  hardened:  budget  constraints,  and  improved
regulatory  frameworks coincide with privatization.  Thie higher the level  of institutional reforms,, the more positive
the economic  performance  impact  from  a change  of.oownership.  In, fact,  the  study  finds  a thteshold  level  of
reforms  in  order for privatization, to have positive eco'nomnic-outcornes.  At Ihe same time,  institutional reforms do
not  guarantee  performance  improvements  unless there  is a minimuim  level of ownership:change.  The  authors
insist that economies must have private ownershipmanpro-competition,policies  to progess; they go  hand in hand
with one another.  While ownership-matters,  policies-and  institutions matter just as much.
Source:  Sachs, Zinnes, and Eilat, 2000
62.  Ultimately,  competition  means  freedom  to  fail.  As allowing  closure  and exit is clear
evidence  of mismanagement,  governments  the  world over  have  proved reluctant  to allow  even
obviously non-viable  firms to fail.  Instead,  they continue  to subsidize and  support them,  even
when  they  are  candidates  for  privatization.  In  some  countries  (Turkey's  initial  privatization
efforts,  for example),  loss-making and unviable enterprises  in the privatization portfolio continue
to be  subsidized  and kept  alive,  leading  to continued  inefficiencies  and  financial  drain.  Funds
that could be used  to pay for  items facilitating privatization,  e.g.  severance  pay,  are  diverted  to
meeting  current  operational  costs  of firms  on the  sale  bloc,  such  as  salaries  of workers  and
managers.  This delays sales; and assets deteriorate further, reducing their value and making them
even  harder  to  sell.  By  contrast,  effective  exit mechanisms  and hard  budget  constraints  were
another  and important factor explaining  the (eventual)  success of privatization  in Poland (Pinto,
1993).
63.  Privatization  has sometimes  led to the liquidation or exit of nonviable firms.  In a number
of cases,  purchasers  have  incorrectly  estimated  the  market  or their  ability to  restructure  firms.
Closures and  liquidations have  resulted,  and private owners were able to  do what public owners
could not.  Critics  have  seized on such cases  (in places  as  different  as  Armenia  and Guinea)  to
claim  that  privatization  is  a  failure.  But  closures  do  not  indicate  that  privatization  was
necessarily  misguided, or that the policy failed.  Had these firms been retained by the state it is a
near  certainty  that  they  would  have  continued  to  receive  a  flow  of  non-productive  and
unsustainable  subsidies,  using  scarce  resources  with high opportunity  costs.  Given  the political
difficulties  associated  with  closure  of SOEs,  privatization  is  a key  mechanism  allowing  the
liberation  and  transfer  of assets  from  problematic  management  in  the  public  sector  to  better24
management  and more productive  use  in the  private  sector.  While the  closure  of SOEs  can be
painful  and  costly  (for  the government,  employees,  creditors),  it nonetheless  produces  benefits
for  the  economy  and  society  at  large  as  employees  and  other  assets  are  better  used  after
restructuring.
64.  Privatization  can lead to poor outcomes when there is slow and halting progress  on hard
budget constraints  from the financial  sector. This problem  is acute  and most evident in transition
economies,  for  example,  in  the  Czech  Republic,  Slovakia  and  countries  of the  former  Soviet
Union, particularly in the mid-1990s.  It is often argued that in these countries insider or diffused
ownership resulting from the voucher method of privatization led to poor results, while transition
economies  such as Hungary and Poland that by contrast sold enterprises  to concentrated owners
did much better.  Performance  thus became  linked  to whether  ownership was  concentrated  or
diffused.
65.  While  there  is  indeed  a  close  correlation  between  the  use  of voucher  privatization
methods  and poor privatization  outcomes  (in the short term,  at  least),  the  underlying  issue  is
that of the  quality,  pace  and  scope  of financial  sector  reforms.  Poor  performance  in the  FSU
countries and others such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia resulted partly because  inadequate
managers/owners  were  handed  the  assets,  but  mainly  because  financial  sector  reforms  were
lacking that would have forced even bad managers  to take the right steps-or leave the way clear
for  other  owners.  The  Czech Republic  is  an  illustrative  case  in point:  through  the  1990s,  the
state dominated commercial  banking, with a  majority interest in half of the sector and essentially
a controlling  interest  in all of it.  Explicit and implicit pressure from government  allowed bank
borrowing  by weak firms,  led by sometimes  corrupt firm managers,  to continue  at a rapid and
unsustainable  rate.  Much of the debt proved  to be  non-performing,  and a  fair percentage  was
stolen  (Cull, Matesova,  and Shirley,  2001).  The credit did not restructure  the firms, weakened
the commercial banks, and made the eventual bail-out one of the biggest ever in the region.
66.  By  contrast,  Estonia,  Hungary  and  Poland  were  far  more  successful  in  privatization
precisely because  they:  (i)  implemented their bank restructuring/privatization  programs  early in
the  transition;  (ii)  dealt  with  the  bad  debt  problems  faster  than  other  countries;  (iii)  tackled
difficult  legal  and  institutional  reforms,  such  as  bankruptcy  and  protection  of  minority
shareholders,  before  the  others;'  and (iv)  received  more inflows of FDI  in the  1990s than  the
other countries.  These factors,  along with their favoring of core,  concentrated owners,  are what
produced positive privatization outcomes.
67.  In  short,  financial  sector  reform  and  the  creation  of a  competitive  and  commercially
oriented banking system is important for successful privatization.  Privatization of banks  is itself
part of the solution.  The recent World Bank research report on finance and growth (World Bank,
2001)  shows that the lower the income of a country, the higher the  proportion  of its bank assets
that will be state-owned.  The argument is that state owned banks will better distribute capital to
more productive investments, provide greater access to credit  for  deserving  sections of society,
and be less prone to crises.  In practice,  these objectives are almost never achieved. It has proven
difficult  to  design  incentives  that  will  guide  even  private  sector  bankers  towards  efficient
1  l  In Poland, where voucher privatization  was limited, there was far more stringent initial regulation of  securities and
there have been many fewer reports of investor dissatisfaction.25
resource  allocation;  when-as  in state-owned  banks-these incentives  are weakened or absent,
for political and other reasons, the results  are far worse.  Thus, although poorly regulated private
banks have incurred large losses, some of the largest losses of recent times have been incurred by
state  banks.  Evidence  shows  that  state  ownership  tends  to  reduce  competition  through  higher
spreads on interest rates, leads to less stock exchange  activity and non-bankn  credit, and results irn
greater concentration  of credit allocation, usually to the largest 20 firms, often inefficient SCEs.
68.  Persistent  poor  performance  of  state-owned  baniks  has  led  governments  to  turn  to
privatization.  The  experience  of  countries  such  as  Argentina,  Chile,  Mexico  and  others
demonstrates  the special case of bank privatization-and  the need to phase and coordinate such
efforts with the development of regulatory frameworks  (Box 5).
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Bank  privatization  has  produced  substantial  savings  and  gains  for  a number  of governments-though  their
experience  generally reveals the complexity  and difficulty of  such reforms  and reveals  lessons on how  it might
be better conducted.  Argentina reduced  state ownership of banking assets from 50 percent  in 1990 to half that by
2000,  motivated  mainly  by  the  high  costs  of maintaining  state  ownership.  The  savings  from  privatizing tie
provincial  banks  are  impressive,  amounting  to  one-third  of a typical  province's  public  expenditure.  Prior  to
privatization the banks had a high percentage of non-performning  loans (50 percent in 1991), which were removed
from the  balance  sheet  as part  of a clean-up  prior  tQ  sale.  Following divestiture,  the  share of non-performing
loans then  rose again,  but this time to levels  comparable  with  the better private  banks in Argentina.  Moreover,
costs to revenue ratios and the terms of credit extendaed to SOEs by these newly privatized  entities more closely
reflected that of other, better-performing,  private banks.
Banks are very special cases, in that their problems can broadly affect other firms and portions of  the economy. In
weak regulatory  environments,  poorly designed and irnplemented bank  privatization have  provoked  crises (e.g.
Chile  in  the  late  1970s,  and  Mexico  in the  early  1990s).  While  these  rapid  and  insufficiently  thought-out
privatizations  were undesirable,  extended  state ownership  can have  an equally detimental  impact,  as the Czech
case,  noted above,  illustrates. The dilemma is that although hasty privatization  in weak environments can lead to
problems, excessive delays can undernine real sector reforns and lead to high costs.
Privatization  of banks remains the preferred  strategy, but it requires  far more care,  caution and preparation than
for the normal commercial  firm.  The  Argentine case,  and that of Hungary,  shows the  need  for sequencing the
phasing  out  of state  ownership  over  time  with  improvements  in the  regulatory  environment.  One  mechanism
aimed at maintaining  value in the rmn-up to sale  is to link manager compensation to the post privatization value
of the  bank  (e.g.  through  stock options  as  happened  in Poland).  Involving reputable  and  experienced  foreign
owners  is very often  part of a successful  strategy.  They can bring the necessary  skills, products and training to
the host country and provide better allocation decisions.
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69.  Lack  of transparency  leads  to  allegations  of corruption  and  provides  ammunition  to
political  and  other  opponents,  creates  backlash  from  investors  and  the public  at  large,  and
threatens to halt privatization and liberalizing reform  in general.  In Argentina, and Latin America26
in general,  a recent survey shows  a substantial recent decline in support of privatization,  mainly
due to weak economic  conditions but also as a result of the ways  in which the process has been
operating  in  practice  and  increases  in  corruption.'2 In Russia,  the  mass  privatization  program
pernmitted  insiders  to  engage  in  extensive  "self-dealing",  while  the  subsequent  privatization
"auctions"  were a massive giveaway of the most important assets  at bargain prices to a handful
of  well-connected  oligarchs,  who,  in  the  absence  of  adequate  legal  and  institutional
arrangements,  continued  to  act that way (Black,  Kraakman,  and Tarassova,  2000).  As a result,
the  public came to oppose  privatization,  associating  it with corruption  and wealth for a  chosen
few.
70.  Putting  transparency  into  place  requires  a  host of measures.  Speed  and full transfer  of
assets, without special  privileges  and concessions  for insiders, is crucial, particularly  in the case
of  competitive  enterprises.  Evidence  from  Mexico,  Bulgaria,  South  Africa  and  elsewhere
indicates  that, once a firm is slated for privatization,  delays in completing the transaction  lead to
a  decline  in operations,  asset stripping,  and  a  lower  sales  price.'3 Ultimately,  few  buyers  may
come  forth  and,  rather  than  liquidating  such  firms  which  is  the  right  technical  approach  but
politically  unpalatable,  special  deals  may  need  to  be  negotiated,  increasing  the  chances  for
intransparencies.  On the other hand, selling firms, particularly infrastructure  firms, in the absence
of efforts to  enhance competition  and regulation,  and thus enhance  transparency  and protection
of consumers  against the  abuse of remaining  monopoly power,  can prove extremely  costly.  The
general  rule should be to move swiftly on the privatization  of firmns  operating in competitive  or
potentially  competitive  markets,  but get the  market  structure  right in  privatizing  infrastructure
firms.
71.  An  effective  institutional  framework  is needed,  though  calling  for it has  proven  easier
than putting  it into  effect.'4 This involves creating some sort of focal point for privatization with
minimal  bureaucracy,  direct  access  to  and  support  of the  highest  political  authorities,  and
adequate  resources  and flexibility to hire the many-and expensive-private  resources needed to
prepare  and  complete  the  sale.  (Independent  financial  advisors  and  qualified  experts  play  an
important  role  in  the  process,  particularly  in  carrying  out  independent,  market-based  asset
valuations  to  ensure  that  prices  are  realistic,  fair-and  politically  defensible.)  Leaving
privatization  to sector ministries  can work where there is a high degree of political commitment
and adequate  administrative  capacity (for a time Bulgarian sector ministries privatized  as well or
better than the national Privatization  Agency), but such conditions are typically lacking in most
countries.  Having a variety of sale points  causes  concerns  about consistency  and transparency,
and raises the  issue of how to find and reward the scarce resources  required in one  privatization
agency, much less many.
72.  Promoting competition  in the transaction process  itself is perhaps the most effective way
to obtain transparency;  as  well, it yields the maximum economic  and financial  benefits.  Clearly
defined  competitive  bidding  procedures  for  calling,  evaluating,  and  awarding  offers  are
important,  including the public opening of bids (in Bolivia, this was done on national television).
12  The Economnist,  July 28-August 3,  p. 38.
13  In  his  study of Mexican  SOEs,  Lopez  de  Silanes  (1997)  found  that net revenues  for government  dropped  24
percent  for each additional year that privatization was delayed.
14  The full range of institutional options  and the tradeoffs involved are discussed in detail in Guislain,  1997.27
In some cases, negotiated  sales may be the only option, but in general,  the greater the openness
and  competition  in  the  selection  process  the  greater  the  likelihood  that  transparency  will  be
achieved-and the higher the price paid.  In his study of Mexico, La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes
(1997)  found  that  an  additional  bidder  participating  in  a tender  increases  the  net  revenues  to
government by  12  percent.  Public offerings  or share issue privatizations  are widely regarded  as
the most transparent and lucrative  to the seller, but again,  many client countries  do not possess
the capital markets, quality firms, or business  environments to apply (very often) this method.
73.  While  there  has  been  much  concern  about  corruption  in  privatization,  Kaufman  and
Siegelbaum  (1996),  in their work on transition  economies,  argue that although there has been an
increase  in  corruption  as  privatization  has  progressed,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that
privatization  is the cause of that corruption.  Different privatization  approaches  have  affected the
incidence of corruption,  depending on the scope of control rights over economic activity retained
by politicians  and bureaucrats  (Box 6). While privatization  itself is a way to address corruption,
the development of a legal and institutional framework is needed to limit the ability of insiders to
self-deal.
Box  6. Privatization,and Cor,ruption4inT-ransition Economies
Privatization-with  all  its inadequacies--is  preferabledto.its  absence:  Kaufinann  and' Siegelbaum  show that the
.incidence  of corruption is, or would be, larger  without privalization, and'that-corruption'is  more.prevalent  in non-
privatized  sectors.  Furthermore,  there  is evidence  to  suggest that kextralegal .aid unofficiai- activities  are more
prevalent  in  countries  that  privatized.less.  And'there.is  incipient  evidence  pointing  to  a  positive.association
between  privitization  and  some  hardening  of the  budget  constraint  (i.e< less  discretionary  handouts.  or tax
exemptions),  as  well  as  between  privatization  and  market  liberalization  (i.e.  less  discretionary  licenses  in the
-hands  of politicians  and  bureaucrats).  Finally,  in some  countries,  corruption1has:been^fueled  by the  lack  of
privatization in agriculture  in parts of.thelenergy-sector.  'In these areas, the study advocates fasterprivatization.
Source:  Kaufnann and Siegelbaun,- 1997.
(iv)  Mitigating the social impact of privatization
74.  Where  restructuring  requires sizable  labor force  reductions,  the process  will  always  be
contentious-but  problems  can be  reduced  if  government,  and  sometimes  the  private  buyers,
dialogue  with  labor  early  in  the  process,  and  jointly  work  out  an  acceptable  approach.
Sometimes,  this dialogue  can go to extraordinary  lengths.  For example,  in China, a Norwegian
private firm entered  into a joint venture with a  Chinese SOE producing  steel.  The Norwegian
investors  worked closely with  SOE  officials  and municipal  authorities to  determine not simply
how many workers would be required in the remodeled firm, but also to ensure that the effects of
layoffs  were  spread  equitably  among  the  workforce.  Wherever  possible, they made  sure  that
when  someone  was  dismissed,  another  family  member  was  retained.  Not  surprisingly,  the
workers  and the locality strongly supported this approach.  In Morocco  the purchaser of an SOE
cement company  agreed to  retain all  employees,  even though there  was an estimated  8 percent
surplus. The new Managing Director indicated that he hoped that expanding business would soon
make these extra people  useful, and that even  if business remained steady the firm would absorb
the extra cost to maintain social peace and stay in good grace with the government.  However, the28
Director  insisted that if demand  declined  greatly,  the firm would renegotiate  their deal  with the
seller.
75.  The  most  common  method  to  deal  with  workforce  reductions  is  the  provision  of
retirement and severance  benefits to encourage voluntary departures  and compensate  for layoffs;
governments  generally  greatly prefer the  formrer  to  the  latter  (Box  7).  Such programs  appear
quite  costly  in  the  short  run.  For  example,  Indian  labor  leaders  are  asking  for  five  years
severance  pay  for  dismissed  employees  over 40  and  with  20  years  or  more  of service;  and
packages  near this size have been  awarded  in Sri Lanka  and Pakistan.  But such programs  are
politically and socially acceptable,  and the financial and economic returns can be high; in recent
World  Bank  projects  that  financed  severance,  the  returns  ranged  from  22  to  44  percent  in
countries  as diverse as Brazil, Croatia,  India, Mozambique,  Tunisia, and Togo.  Yet, care must be
taken  to  avoid overly  generous packages  that result in unsustainable  costs,  lead to problems  of
adverse  selection,  and,  in  the case  of early  retirement  payments,  create  undue  burden  on the
social security system (Kikeri,  1998; Rama,  1999).  Selling or awarding shares to employees (and
sometimes  retirees)  in the  newly privatized  firm  is  another  way of compensating  workers  and
allowing them to share in the gains of privatization.
Box 7:  Dealing with Labor Redundancies in Brazil Railways
Addressing  overstaffing was a critical issue in the privatization of Brazil Railways. The government started  labor
restructuring  prior to privatization in order to attract investors  and mitigate the social impact. Nearly 40 percent of
the original workforce  of 42,000  left on  a first-come  first-served basis through a  combination  of early retirement
and  voluntary  and  involuntary  separations.  Close  to  12,000  employees  opted for early  retirement,  while  about
6,000 chose  voluntary separation.  The number of early retirees  was much  higher than  the estimated number of
5,000.  During the program, social  security reform was passed which implied that entitlement to retirement would
no  longer be based on  the number  of years  worked but  on age mostly, providing  an incentive for the  average
worker  with  18 years of experience  who  would otherwise  have stayed on  to retire. Involuntary  separation,  based
on performance,  was appliedto  400 employees  at 80  percent of the  voluntary  separation  package.  On average,
the  financial package  equaled -22-months of salary  as compared to the legal requirement of 10 months. The total
retrenchment  cost, financed by the govermment  and intemational  institutions,  amounted  to US$365 million as of
February  1998,  with  a 40  percent  economic  rate  of return.  The  concessionaires  subsequently  retrenched  an
additional  17,000  people  through involuntary  separation of  which 70 percent were retrenched  within one year of
operation.  The concessionaires  were required  for a period of one year after they assumed operations  to pay the
same  financial  packages  as paid by the govenmment.  By May 2000  more  than  80%  of the  initial  work force  had
been retrenched since the start of the privatization.
In  addition  to  severance  packages,  retraining  support  and  outplacement  services  were  provided.  Actual
participation  in  training  and  outplacement  programs  was  significantly  lower  than  initial  estimates.  The  low
attendance  was  mainly  caused  by  delays  in  finalizing  implementation  arrangements  with  the  various  service
providers.  The cost of training and outplacement was approxirmately  US$12 million.
Source:  Estache, Sydenstrickeri and Schmitt  de Azevedo, October  2000.
76.  Compensation  packages  have  often  been  combined  with  retraining  to  help  workers
reintegrate  into the labor market.  While popular with governnents  and donors alike,  evaluations
question  their  cost  effectiveness.  Targeted,  demand-driven  support  on  a  pilot  basis  with
competition  and performance-based  arrangements  for service  delivery have  a better  chance  of
succeeding,  while  counseling  and job  search  assistance  are  found  to  be more  cost  effective.29
Contracting  arrangements  are another  option;  in  Argentina,  5000  surplus  YPF  workers  started
200  private businesses  providing  YPF  with various  contract  services;  this  approach  has  been
tried  in  Egypt  and  Algeria  as  well.  In  an  electronics  SOE  in  Alexandria,  carpentry  and
maintenance  services  were contracted  out, with those previously employed  in these tasks given,
free,  the tool and workspace  to do the job as  private suppliers.  They were  also given,  without
bidding,  one  or two  year contracts  to provide the  service,  before the  contracts  would be re-bid
competitively.  This  gave  the former  workers  a chance  to learn  the  business  and  compete  with
more experienced bidders.
77.  In  countries  with  rapidly  growing  economies  and  a  well-developed  private  sector,
measures  such  as  severance  pay  and  employee  share  ownership  schemes  might be  all  that are
needed.  By contrast,  in low-income  and transition  economies  where  state  enterprises  dominate
the  labor  market  and  where  alternative  employment  is  hard  to  find,  the key  is  to  improve  the
overall investment climate,  including labor market reforms,  so as to generate  growth and private
sector job creation,  thereby  facilitating  the needed  adjustments  and the movement of redundant
workers  to other jobs.
(v)  Environmental implications
78.  Wasteful  resource  use  and  the  poor  financial  situation  of  SOEs  has  meant  higher
abatement  costs,  less  investment in both  modern  technology  and  pollution  control,  and  higher
pollution  intensity.  Recent research  indicates  that  SOEs pollute more than  private  firms  (Wang
and Wheeler,  1996; Dasgupta, Huq, and Wheeler,  1997).  A four-country survey of pulp mills in
Thailand,  Bangladesh,  India, and Indonesia  shows that state-owned plants make far less effort to
abate pollution than their private counterparts (Hartman,  Huq, and Wheeler,  1997).
79.  Efforts  to  improve the  environmental  performance  of state  enterprises  have  been made,
but,  as  in  most other  SOE  reforms,  back-sliding  is common.  Cash-strapped  SOEs  keep  using
older and dirtier  equipment.  Moreover,  SOEs  escape  environmental  regulation  and enforcement
to a greater extent than private firms.  For example,  in Indonesia's  Program for Pollution Control,
Evaluation and Rating  (PROPER) program,  SOEs were more compliant than  private firms when
the program began, but after  18 months  the record of the two types of enterprises did not differ
significantly.  As  SOEs  are  less  susceptible  to outside  pressure,  public  information  exerts  less
influence  on their behavior.  State-owned  enterprises  can  thus  be  expected  to lag  behind  other
firms participating in PROPER in the coming years (Hartman, Huq, and Wheeler,  1997).
80.  Recent  research  shows  that  privatization  offers  an  opportunity  for  environmental
improvements  (Box  8).  Private  firms  tend to  invest  in new  technology  to  improve  efficiency,
comply  with regulations,  and  respond to pressures  from  various  stakeholder  groups.  To realize
the full environmental  benefits  of privatization,  governments  need  to incorporate environmental
considerations  into  privatization  transactions  and  develop  policy  and  regulatory  systems  that
ensure  compliance  and  continued  improvements  (Lovei,  1999).  Concerns  about  subsequent
delays in the privatization  process must be weighed  against the  fact that such efforts clarify  the
risks  and  potential  future  costs  and  treatment of any liabilities,  particularly  in sectors  such  as
mining,  chemicals,  and petroleum  refining.  Privatization  and environmental  agencies  generally
lack  experience  in  this  regard.  As  much  as  possible,  the  work  should  be  outsourced  to
consultants  and mechanisms  for including regulatory authorities established.30
Box  8:  Improved Environmental Performance in Mexico
Altos  Hornos  de  Mexico  (EHMSA),  an  integrated  steel  mill,  was  sold  to  a consortium  of intemational  and
domestic  investors  in  1991.  The  Mexican  govemment  had  expected  a  higher  sale  price  if environmental
requirements  were  clearly expressed  at the time  of the sale.  Therefore,  an  environmental  audit was  carried  out,
and  its results  were used to agree  on a three-year  environmental  compliance  plan.  Between  1991  and  1995 the
company  decreased  its  dust  emissions  by  more  than  70  percent  and  total  water  discharges  by  more  than  60
percent, reduced  the amount of solid waste generated per unit of production, and,introduced  programs to improve
the  surrounding  environment.  The  improvements  came  from  process  changes  and  upgrades,  environmental
investments, and changes in plant management.
Source:  Lovei,  199931
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A.  General
Bamet.  Steven.  2000.  "Evidence  The  study  investigates  the  impact  of  Privatization  proceeds  transferred  to  the budget  are
on  the  Fiscal  and  Macroeconomic  privatzation  on  fiscal  and  largely used  to reduce  domestc financing, with litte
Impact  of  Privatization.'  IMF  macroeconomic performance.  evidence  that  they  are  used  to  finance  a  larger
Working  Paper  WP/00/130.  deficit.  The  privatzation  process  is  strongly
Washington  D.C.:  Intemational  correlated  with  an  improvement  in macroeconomic
Monetary Fund.  performance  in the  form  of higher real  GDP  growth
htt):I/www.imf.oralextemal/oubs/ftJw  and  lower  unemployment  rates.  The  estimates
D/2000w"001 30.odt  suggest  that  a one  percent  of  GDP  privatization
corresponds  to  0.5  percentage  point  increase  in
contemporaneous  real  GDP growth  and a further 0.4
percentage point increase in the following  year.  The
point estimates  also  suggest that a  one  percent  of
GDP  privatization is associated with  a decline in the
unemployment  rate  of  just  less  than  /.  of  a
percentage  point  in the  year  of privatization  and a
further  /.  percentage  point  in  the  following  year,
resulting  in  a  total  impact  of  around  % of  a
percentage point
Boardman,  Anthony  E.,  and  Aldan  Contains  a  comparlson  of  the  The  authors  find  that  state-owned  and  mixed
R.  Vining.  1989.  'Ownership  and  performance  of the  500  largest  non-US  ownership  firms  are  significantly  less  profitable  and
Performance  in  Competitive  industrial  firms  in  1983.  Results  are  productive than  privately-owned companies.  To gain
Environments:  A Comparison  of the  compared for private corporations,  mixed  efficiency full privatization  is needed  because mixed
Performance  of Private,  Mixed,  and  enterprises and state-owned  enterprises.  ownerships firms  are  no more  profitable  than  those
State-Owned  Enterprises."  Joumal  The  comparison  is  on  the basis  of four  owned wholly by the state.
of Law and Economics.  32:  1-33.  measures  of  profitability:  return  on
equity,  return  on  assets,  retum  on sales
and  net  income.  Also  includes  two
measures  of  X-effidency:  sales  per
employee and sales per asset
Boubakri, Narjess, and Jean-Claude  The  study  examines  post-privatizabon  The study concludes that there are economically and
Cosset  1998.  'The  Finandal  and  financial  and  operating  performance  of  statistically significant post-privatization  increases  in
Operating  Performance  of  Newly  79 companies in  21  developing countries  output  (real sales),  operatng  efficiency,  profitability,
Privatized  Firms:  Evidence  From  and 32 industries  between 198g01992.  capital investrnent spending, dividend payments,  and
Developing  Countries."  Joumal  of  employment  as  well  as  significant  decreases  in
Finance.  53:1081-1110.  leverage.  About 60 percent of sample firms showed
an  increase  in employment  of  5-10  percent  after
privatization.  Real  sales  per employee  increased  by
27  percent  Unadjusted  net  income  per  employee
increased on average by 63 percent
Davis,  Jeffrey,  Rolando  Ossowski,  This  paper separates the  possible fiscal  The  study  finds  that  receipts  of  prtvatzaton  are
Thomas  Richardson  and  Steven  and  other  macroeconomic  impacts  of  saved rather than spent Over time the fiscal situation
Bamett.  2000.  'Fiscal  and  privaization.  Is improved  by  privatizabon  with  posiSve  impacts
Macroeconomic  Aspects  of  upon revenue and for some countries a  arge dedine
Privatization.'  IMF  Occasional  In defidts. In terms of growth private firms am  found
Paper  No.  194.  Washington  D.C.:  to  be  more  efficient  than  those  run  by  the  state,
Intemabonal  Monetary Fund.  especially  in  competitive  industrbies.  The  strong
correlation  that  exists  between  growth  and
privatzabon  may be because privatkation is a proxy
for  the  more  general  factor  of  'favorable  regime
change'.  The  authors  also find  that  unemployment
falls  after  privazatbon,  but  that  it  may  have
detrimental  impacts on paricular groups of workers.
Overall  the posibive  effects of privatization on  growth
and  employment  hold  for  all  countries  examined,
although to a lesser extent in transitlon economies.32
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Dewenter,  Kathryn,  and  Paul  H.  Uses  data  from  8  countries  (Canada,  Results  vary  according  to  country:  the  UK  shows
Malatesta.  1997.  'Public Offerings  France,  Hungary,  Japan,  Malaysia,  significantly  higher  inital  retums  on  PIPOs  than
of  State-Owned  and  Privately-  Poland,  Thailand  and  UK)  to  compare  pnvate  sector  1POs,  while  Canada  and  Malaysia
Owned  Enterprises: An  Intemational  initial  retums  for  109  companies  with  point  to  the  opposite  case.  Also  PIPOs  in
Companson.  Joumal  of Finance,  national  average  retums.  Also  tests  unregulated  industries  tend  to be less  than those  for
52:  1659-1679.  whether  PIPOs  are  more  or  less  under  regulated  industries.  There  is  therefore  no  evidence
priced  than private sector IPOs.  that govemments systematically underpnce PIPOs.
Relatively  primitive  capital  markets  (in  this  case
Hungary,  Malaysia,  Poland and  Thailand)  leads to  a
tendency  for  higher  initial  retums  than  offers  in
countnes with  more  developed capital markets.  The
authors  suggest  that  this  is  due  to  an  increased
uncertainty that about the  value of pnvatzation offers
leading to lower  offer  prices.  Another  suggestion is
that  those  countries  with  relatively  primitive  capital
markets may  try to broaden private  share ownership
by decreasing the initial offer price.
Dewenter,  Kathryn,  and  Paul  H.  This  study  tests  whether  profitability,  After taking into account the effect of business cycles
Malatesta.  Forthcoming.  'State-  labor  intensity and  debt levels  of SOEs  it  is found  that  private  firms  are  significantly  more
Owned  and  Privately-Owned  Firms:  varies  from  that of privately owned  firms.  profitable  than  SOEs,  and  have lower  levels of debt
An Empirical Analysis  of Profitability,  The  authors  use  a  sample  of  the  500  and less labor intensive  production.
Leverage,  and  Labour  Intensity."  largest  non-US  firms  in  1975,  1985  and
American  Economic Review.  1995.
D'Souza,  Juliet,  and  William  L.  The  paper  documents  offering  terms,  The  study  compares  three-year  average  post-
Megginson.  1999.  'The  Financial  method  of sale,  and  ownership structure  pnvatization  financial  and  operating  pe;formance
and  Operating  Performance  of  resulting  from  privatization  of  78  ratios to the three-year pre-privatization  values for a
Newly  Privatized  Firms  in  the  companies  (mostly  from  sub-sample of 26 firms.  It condudes that there  were
1990s."  Joumal  of Finance.  54:  telecommunications  and other  regulated  economically  and  statistically  significant  post-
1397.  industries)  from  10  developing  and  15  privatization  increases  in  output  (real  sales),
developed  countries  over  the  period  operating  efficlency,  and  profitability,  as  well  as
1990-1994.  significant decreases  in leverage. Capital  investment
spending  slighty  increased,  while  employment
declined significantly.
D'Souza,  Juliet,  Robert  Nash,  and  Using  a  sample  of  118  firms  (from  29  They  find  that  there  are  significant  increases  in
William  L.  Megginson.  2000.  countries  and  28  industries)  that  were  profitability,  efficiency,  output,  and  capital
'Determinants  of  Performance  privatized  through  public  chare  offering  expenditure,  while  leverage  also  decreases
Improvement  in  Newly-Privatized  between  1961  and  1995 the authors  look  significanty.  Looking  at  the  determinants  of  these
Firms:  Does  Restructuring  and  at  operating  performance  of  the  improvements  they  find  that  stronger  profitability
Corporate  Govemance  Matter?'  enterprises.  gains  come  from  firms  with  lower  employee
Working  Paper.  Norman,  OK:  ownership  and  higher state  ownership.  Output gains
University of Oklahoma.  are  stronger  in  competitive  markets  and  where  the
Httoi//facult-  economy  is growing  faster and  efficlency gains  are
staff.ou.edu/MNVIIIvam.L.Meocinson-  higher when foreign ownership is high.
1  Iorvsources.odf
Galal,  Ahmed,  Leroy Jones,  Pankaj  The  study  measures  the  effects  of  The  authors  find  that  divestiture  substantially
Tandoon,  and  Ingo  Vogelsang.  divestiture  by  comparing  actual  post-  improved  economic  welfare  in  11  of the  12  cases.
1994.  Weffare  Consequences  of  privatization  performance  of  12  large  The gains were  mainly due to a  dramatic increase in
Selling  Public  Enterprises:  An  firms  (in  aviation,  energy,  investment,  improved  productivity,  more  rational
Empirical  Analysis.  Washington  telecommunications,  transportabon  and  priclng  policles,  and  increased  competition  and
D.C.:  World Bank.  shipping) in Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, and  effective  regulaton.  Despite  assuring  that  public
U.K.  with  their  performance  prior  to  managers  would  adopt  new  technology  and  more
divestiture.  rational  procedures  they  also  concluded  that
privatized  firm  performance  was  superior  to  the
altemative of state ownership.
Jones,  Steven  L.,  William  L.  The  study focuses  on  how  political  and  The  mean level of initial retums are found to be 34.1
Megginson,  Robert  C.  Nash,  and  economic factors  influence  initial retums  percent for SIPs and 9.4 percent for seasoned  SIPS.
Jeffry M.  Netter.  1999. 'Share  Issue  of SIPs using a sample of 630 SIPs from  The authors do not compare SIPs with private sector
Privatizations  as Financial  Means to  59 countries between  1977-1997.  IPOs  because of their belief that any underpriclng is
Polifical  and  Economic  Ends.  caused  by  different  factors  (political  considerations33
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Joumal of Financial  Economics.  53:  and  asymmetric  information  respectively)  and
217-253.  therefore does not lead to any meaningful  insights.
The  study also  finds that  inibal  retums on  SIPs are:
(i)  positively  related  to  the  fraction  of the  SOE  on
offer, (ii) positively related to the income inequality in
the  country,  and  (iii) not  inversely  related  to  the
market value of the former SOE.
Megginson,  William,  Robert  Nash,  Compares  both  pre  and  post-  Significant  increases  in  output,  operating  efficiency,
and  Matthias  van  Randenborgh.  privatization  3-year  average  profitability,  capital  investment  spending  and
1994.  'The  Financial  and Operating  performance  ratios  for  61  firms  in  18  dividend  payments  are  found  along  with  significant
Performance  of  Newty  Privatized  countries over the period 1961-1989.  decreases in  leverage.  The  changes  in  employment
Firms:  An  Intemational  Empirical  after privatization  are found to be insignificant
Analysis."  Joumal  of Finance.  49:
403-452.
Megginson,  William,  Robert  Nash,  Over  the  period  1981-1997  this  study  First year  mean  holding-period  retums  for  the  SIPs
Jeffry  Netter,  and  Adam  Schwartz.  examines the performance  of 158 PIPOs  are  found  to  be  25.1  percent,  which  compares
2000.  'The  Long  Term  Retum  to  form  33 countries.  The authors  compute  favorably  to  the  mean  local  currency  home  market
Investors  in  Share  Issue  1,  3  and  5-year  retums  in  both  local  retums  (13.2%),  FT  world  Index  (13.1%)  and  S&P
Privatizations.7  Financial  currency  and  US  dollars  and  compare  500  Index (17.6%).  The  HPR for  industry  matching
Management.  29: 67-77.  results  to  intemational  and  national  firms  is also  less  than that for  the  SIPs  (15%).  This
indices as well as matching  firm types.  result  is  statistically  significant  for  all  of the indices
used.  Similar results  are  found after  3 and  5 years,
with  excess  retums  exceeding  80  percent  for  most
indices.
Megginson,  William  L.,  and  Jeffrey  The  paper  surveys  the  rapidly  growing  The  paper idenbfies the following  main  lessons from
M.  Netter.  2001.  'From  State  to  literature  on  privatzation,  attempts  to  the  literature on privatization:
Market:  A  Survey  of  Empirical  frame  and answer the  key questions this
Studies  of  Privatization.'  Mimeo.  stream  of research  has  addressed,  and  The  privatizabon  programs  of the  last 20 years have
Forthcoming in Joumal of Economic  then  describes  some  of  its  lessons  on  reduced the role of SOEs in the economic life of most
Uterature.  the  promise  and  perils  of  state-owned  countries.  Most  of  this  reducton  in  developing
httDo//www.aei.brookinas.ora  assets.  countries  has  taken  place  only  in the  1  990s.  The
oulicatioWslrelated/rivatization.odf  SOE  share  of 'global GDP"  has  declined from  more
than 10  percent in 1979 to less than 6 percent today.
Privately owned  firms  are  more efficient  and  more
profitable than  comparable  state-owned firms. There
is limited  empirical  evidence,  especially from  China,
that suggests  that non-privatzing  reform  measures -
such  as price deregulabon,  market  liberalizabon, and
increased  use  of  incenbives  - can  improve  the
efficiency of SOEs,  but it also seems likely that these
reforms would be even more effective if coupled with
pnivatzabon.
Nellis, John.  1994. 'is Privabtzaion  In  this  study  the  author  argues  that  There  are  a  number  of  reforms  that  could  help  to
Necessaryr  Public  Policy  for the  privabzabon  is  necessary.  He  argues  combat these  problems  that do not involve changing
Private Sector Note 17.  Washington  that  there  are  several  reasons  why  the  ownership  of  the  firm,  and  there  is  some
D.C.:  World Bank.  private  firms  perform  better than  SOEs.  empirical  evidence  to  suggest  that  they  can  be
There  Is  a  market  for  managers  that  successful.  However  the  author  argues  that
leads  to  higher  quality  management;  ownership  is  still  the  best  way  to  improve
capital  markets  subject private  firms  to  performance.  While  it  is  seen  that  there  may  be
greater  scrutiny;  they  are  much  more  some ovedap in the performance of private firms and
subject  to  exit  than  SOEs;  politicians  SOEs,  in  general  private  firms  outperform  SOEs.
interfere  less  with  their  running;  and  Empirical  evidence also back this up with the majority
private  firms  are  owned  by  self-  of  pre  and  post-privatzabon  studies  showing
interested  shareholders  rather  than  significant  improvements  in  various  factors  after
'disinterested  bureaucrats'.  privatzalon.  Lastly.  the  author  argues  that  partial
reforms  implemented  by  govemments  often amount
to  no  more  than  a  compromise  and  that  they  are
often  prone  to reversing  policy decisions or relaxing
them.  This  is  something  that  can  be  avoided  if
privatization is conducted.34
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Sheshinski,  Eytan  and  Luis  Felipe  The  paper  reviews  the  micro  and  The  evidence  shows  that  pnvatized  firms  improve
Lopez-Calva.  1999.  'Pnvatizabon  macroeconomic  effects  of  privatzabon  their  profitability  after  the sale,  even  controlling  for
and  its  Benefits:  Theory  and  based  on  a  survey  of  the  empirical  macroeconomic  and  industry specific factors.  This
Evidence.'  Development  literature.  result  holds  for  different  market  structures.
Discussion  Paper 698.  Cambridge,  Deregulabon  policies  speed  up  the  convergence
MA:Harvard  Insttute  for  process  of  firms  to  industry  standards.  Partial
Intemabonal Development.  pnvatization  has a  lower  effect  on  profitability  when
htto:llwww.hiid.harvard.edu/oroiectl  .compared  with  full  privatzabon.  Microeconomic
httc://www.hild.harvard.edu/froect  evidence confirms that the  introduction of compebtion
caer/oapers/paper35.Ddf  enhances  productvity  gains.  Firms  in  more
concentrated  and  regulated  markets,  though  they
also go  through  an  important  restructuring  after the
sale,  show  lower  increases  in  productivity  as
compared  to  those that are  under market  discipline.
Eliminating  restrictions  to  foreign  direct  investment
and  trade  barriers,  and  govemment  controls  on
prces  and  quantbes  fuels  the catch-up  of firms  to
competbive  standards.  The  budget  deficit shows a
posibve  trend,  i.e.,  it  deciines  during  the  reform
period.
Shirley,  Mary,  and  Patrick  Walsh.  The paper reviews the  debate over state  Theoretical  studies are  ambiguous about the  effects
2000. 'Public  vs. Private  Ownership:  ownership  by  searching  theoretcal  and  of ownership. Empirical  literature,  however,  suggests
The  Current  State  of  the  Debate."  empirical  studies  for  answers  to  the  that while market structure  has  a positive  impact on
WorHd  Bank  Policy  Research  following questions:  (i) Does competibon  performance,  this  impact  fails  to  dominate  the
Working  Paper 2420.  Washington,  matter  more  than  ownership?  (ii)  Are  ownership  effect.  The  arguments  that  market-
D.C.:  World  Bank.  SOEs  more  subject to  welfare  reducing  structure  dominates  rests  on  cases  in which  public
htto://econ.worldbank.ora/files/1175  interventons by govemment than private  and  private  firms  in  compebtiive  environments
wDs2420.odf  firms?  (iii) Do  SOEs  suffer  more  from  perform equally well, and these cases are rare.  Both
corporate  govemance  problems  than  the theoretcal and empirical literature are ambiguous
private firms?  about the  effects of ownership in monopoly markets.
Theories  that  assume  a  welfare  maximizing
govemment  suggest that  SOEs  can  correct market
failures,  but  public  choice theories  are  skeptcal of
these  type  govemment  models.  Corporate
govemance  theories  suggest  that  even  well
intenboned  govemments  may  not be  able  to  assure
that SOE  managers  do their bidding.  The  empirical
literature favors the latter view of SOEs.  In studies of
industrialized countries, where we might expect more
developed  politcal  markets  to  motivate  greater
govemment  concem  with  welfare  maximization  or
better  informabon  and  incenfives  to  overcome
corporate  govemance  problems,  private  firms  still
have  an  advantage.  Theoretical  critiques  of
privatzabon  suggest that distorted objectves,  market
failures  and  poor  institutbons  will  lead  to  costly
failures.  Some  of  these  studies  suffer  from  the
absence  of  a  realistic  SOE  counterfactual  or  are
extrapolating  from  a  few,  prominent  cases,  such as
Russia.  The  21  empirical  studies cited  in this  paper
suggest  that  most  firms  do  better  and  all  firms  at
least as well  after privabzabon.  None  of the  studies
find  that performance  would  be  better had  they  not
been privatized.
B. Developing Countries
Bemal,  Richard  L., and Wihsome  J.  This  study  analyzes  privatization  Overall,  privatizabon  has had  positive  effects in  the
Leslie.  1999.  'Privatzation  in  the  inibatives  in  the  English-speaking  Caribbean.
English-Speaking  Caribbean:  An  Caribbean.  It  examines  the  various
Assessment'"  CSIS Policy  Papers  modalities  which  countries  have  ublized  There  have been net gains in tems of employment
on the Amencas.  X(7).  for  private  sector  involvement  in  the  Inibal divestment of agricultural lands  in Jamaica, for
state sector and examines  the impact on  example,  resulted  in  employment  increases  of  150
http  hwcsIs.ora/americas/oubs/o  employment  economic  efficiency,  and  percent  As  a  result,  the  trade  unions  have  been
pPrivAssessmentDdf  Ith  -m*1,NWy  nf  n,c-, -I  generally  supportive  of  the  govemments  efforts.35
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the availability of goods and services.  Efficiency and  company performance have improved.
In  the  hotel  sector  in  Jamaica,  for  example,
occupancy levels in privatzed hotels are now over 85
percent.  as  a  result  of  aggressive  marketng
strategies,  tghter  management,  and  physical
refurbishing.  Privatzation  has  contributed
significantly to the reduction in fiscal defidts, not only
because of the initial injecton of funds after sale,  but
also due  to the elimination  of govemment financing
for  unprofitable  enterprises.  Privatization  has  also
brought  foreign  exchange  from  foreign  as  well  as
local investors.
Boubakri,  Narjess, and  Jean-Claude  The  study compares  three-year  average  The study concludes that there are economically and
Cosset.  1998.  'The  Financial  and  post-privatization  financial and  operating  statistcally  significant post-privatization  increases  in
Operatng  Performance  of  Newly  performance  rabos to the three-year pre-  output  (real  sales),  operating  efficiency,  profitability,
Prvatzed  Firms:  Evidence  From  privatization  values  for  79  companies  capital investment spending, dividend payments, and
Developing  Countries.'  Joumal  of  from  21  developing  countries  and  32  employment  as  well  as  significant  decreases  in
Finance.  53: 1081-1110.  industries over the period  1980-1992.  leverage.
Boubakri,  Narjess, and  Jean-Claude  The  study  examines  pre-  versus  post-  It finds  a  significant increase  in capital  spending by
Cosset.  1999.  'Does  Privatizaton  privatzaton  performance  of  16  African  pnvatized  firms,  but  only  insignificant  changes  in
Meet  the  ExpectaUons?  Evidence  firms  privatized  through  public  share  profitability, efficiency, output and leverage.
From  African  Countries."  Working  offering during the period  1989-1996.
Paper.  Montreal:  Ecole des HEC.
Jones,  Leroy,  Yahya  Jammal,  and  The  study  covers  the  welfare  For the entre privatized  sector, they concluded that
Nilgun  Gokur.  1999.  'Impact  of  consequences  of  81  privatizatons  in  there  were  substantial  benefits:  (i)  the  firms
Privatizaton  in  COte  D'lvoire."  COte  dilvoire,  covering  not  just  perfofmed  better  after  privatizaton;  (ii)  they
Mirneo.  Boston  Insttute  for  infrastructure  firms  but a  range of firms  performed  better  than  they  would  have  had  they
Developing Economies.  already operaUng  in competive markets  remained  under public ownership;  and  (iii) the set of
(in  agriculture,  agro-industries,  tradable  transactons  as  a  whole  contributed  positvely  to
and non-tradable sectors).  economic  welfare,  with  annual  net  welfare  benefits
equivalent  to  about  25  percent  of  pre-divestiture
sales.  These  results  stemmed  from  a  number  of
effects,  including  increases  in output,  investment,
labor  productivity,  and  intermediate-input
productvity.
La  Porta,  Rafael,  and  Florencio  Critcisms of privatzaton have centered  The authors  find that  privatized fimns  quickly bridge
Lopez-de-Sibanes.  1997.  'The  around  the  possibility that the  observed  the pre-privaizaton  performance  gap  with  industry-
Benefit~ of  Privatizaton:  Evidence  higher  profitability  of  privatized  matched control groups.  For example,  privatzaon is
from  Mexico.  NBERR  Working  companies comes  at the expense  of the  followed  by  a  24  percentage  point  increase  in  the
Paper  6215.  Cambridge,  MA:  rest of society. In this paper,  the authors  ratio  of operating  income  to sales.  Those  gains  in
National  Bureau  of  Economic  focus on two of the most likely channels  profitability are  roughly decomposed  as follows:  10
Research.  for social  losses:  a)  Increased  prices as  percent  of  the  increase  is  due  to  higher  product
fimis  capitalize  on  the  market  power;  prices;  33  percent  of  the  increase  represents  a
http:/lraers.nber.ora/panersiW621  and b) layoffs  and lower wages as firms  transfer from  laid-off workers;  and  productivity gains
5  Ddf  seek  to  roll  back  generous  labor  account for  the residual  57  peroent  Transfers  from
contracts.  This  study  uses  data  for  all  society to the firm  are partally offset by taxes which
218 non-financial  privatzatlons that took  absorb  slightly  over  half  the  gains  in  operatng
place in Mexico between 1983 and 1991.  income.  Finally,  they  also find  evidence  indicatng
that  deregulaton  is  associated  with  faster
convergence to industry benchmarks.
Macedo,  Robert.  2000.  This  paper  focuses  on  the  Brazilian  The  paper concludes that privaization contributed to
'Privatzaton  and the Distribubon of  privation  program  undertaken  in  the  softening both the fiscal and the extemal constraints,
Assets  and  Income  in  Brazil."  1990s.  by allowing  an enlarged  public debt and aggravating
Working  Paper.  Camegie  foreign  Imbalances.  Because  of  macroeconomic
Endowment for Intematonal  Peace.  mismanagement,  the  objectives  of  reducing  the
public debt was not achieved.  In  spite of the size of
the  program,  the  govemment  ended  up  with
increased  liabilItes.  With  respect  to  income
distributon,  the  paper  condudes  that  it  was  also
aggravated,  since  the  poorest  groups  did  not  have
access to the assets and  the gains  of privatizadon,36
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and  will  in  the  end  share  in  the  payment  of  an
increased  public  debt  and  of  a  larger  interest  bill.
The better off,  on the contrary, reaped  the benefits of
pnvatizaton, and of the larger interest rates practiced
by  the  govemment.  Some  correcton  of  these
distortions  might  occur  depending  on  how  the
govemment  spends  the  higher  tax  receipts  it  is
collechng  from  the  former  SOEs,  as  they  become
more  efficient  and  profitable,  a  performance  also
supported by the evidence presented in  the paper.
Majumdar,  Sumit  K.  1996.  The  study looks  into  the  performance  of  Industry-level  survey  data  reveals  efficiency  scores
'Assessing  Comparative  Efficiency  Indian  SOEs,  mixed  ownership  averaging  0.975  for  pnvately-owned  firms,  which  is
of  the  State-Owned,  Mixed,  and  enterprises  and  pnvate  firms  during  significanUy  higher  than  both  mixed ownership  firms
Private  Sectors  in  Indian  Industry."  1973-1989.  (0.912)  and  SOEs  (0.638).  Any  state  sector
Public Choice.  96:1-24.  improvement  is  caused  by  concerted  efficency
drives," but quickly declines afterwards.
Shirley,  Mary  M.  1998.  'Why  A  study  of  performance  contracts,  This  study  shows  that  only  a  few  cases  actually
Performance  Contracts  for  State-  looking at  12  enterprises in  6 developing  improved performance  (in  terms of labor productivity
Owned  Enterprises  Haven't  countries  and  total  factor  productivity)  after  signing
Worked."  Public  Policy  for  the  performance  contracts.  On  the  whole  performance
Private  Sector  Note  150.  was  unchanged,  with  a  few  enterprises  actually
Washington D.C.:  The World Bank.  showing  declining  performance.  The  contracts  are
found to have  many flaws in that they assign soft or
htto://www.worldbank.ora/html/fpd/n  inappropriate  measures  of  economic  performance
otes/150/150shirl.odf  (e.g.  output - which takes no account for productivity
and can therefore lead to inefficiency in achieving the
goal).
To combat these problems  contracts must reduce the
informaton  advantage  of  managers  over  owners,
and  thus  lead  to  appropriate  targets  being  set
Incentives  provided  to  managers must also motivate
them.  Many  contracts  in  the  study  do  not  include
either  bonuses  or  punishments  for  under-
achievement.  Lasty,  the  bonuses  that  are  included
must  be  enforceable.  Contracts  in  the  study  that
included bonuses did not allow the managers to take
the  state  to  court if  they failed  to  pay.  Once  these
three  items  are  included  in  a  contract  it  has  been
shown  that performance  improves.
USAID.  2000.  'The  Post  This  study  evaluates  the  post  Three of the  12 companies were noticeably reformed
Privatization  Development  of  privatzation  performance  of  15  former  after  privatzation  as  control  was  passed  to  the
Formner  Law  203  Companies:  15  SOEs  in Egypt, examining  the degree  to  private  sector  and  corporate  govemance  was
Case  Studies."  Special  Study  for  which  the  firms  are  independent  of the  improved.  Six firms  are  in  a  transitonal phase with
USAID  by  CARANA  Corporabon.  state  after privatizabon.  new  shareholders  having  implemented  changes  in
Washington  D.C.:  United  States  business  strategies,  though  the  essential
Agency  for  Intemabonal  management  structure  and  corporate  culture
Development  remained  fundamentally unchanged.  The  remaining
six remained under state control despite privatzation.
The main reason for the mixed performance of the 12
companies  is that  while  51  percent  of  more  equity
was sold, the state stll remained  as the largest single
shareholder  in  the  enterprise,  giving  it  a
disproportonately  large voice in decision-making.
C. Transition Economies
Barbens,  Nicholas,  Maxim  Boycko,  The  study  surveys  452  Russian  firms  The  authors  find  that  new  owners  and  managers
Andrei  Shleifer,  and  Natalia  that were  sound  at the beginning of the  increase  the  chance  of restructuring  that  Increases
Tsukanova.  1996.  'How  Does  1990s  and  attempts  to  measure  the  value.  They  emphasize  the  importance  of  new
Privatization Work?  Evidence  From  relabve  importance  of  the  channels  human  capital  in the  restructuring  process  and find
the  Russian  Shops.'  Joumal  of  through which  privatization  can  promote  that equity incentives do not improve performance.
Po/Rical Economy.  104:  764-790.  restructuring.37
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Political Economy.  104: 764-790.
Black,  Bemard,  Reinier  Kraakman,  A descriptive  survey  of  the  history  of  The  authors  find  that  privatizabon  has  created  a
and Anna  Tarassova.  Forthcoming.  privatzation  in Russia.  Several  specific  'kleptocracy"  and  has  failed.  They  emphasize  the
'Russian  Privatization  and  cases are analyzed in  more detail.  importance of  decreasing  incentves for self-dealing
Corporate  Govemance:  What  Went  when programs  of privatizabon are designed.
Wrong?'  Stanford Law Review.
Brada,  Josef C. 1996.  'Privatization  This study sets out the different methods  Privatization  can occur in a number of ways,  through
is  Transition-Or  is  it?'  Joumal  of  of privatization.  resUtution,  sale of  state  property,  mass  or  voucher
Economic  Perspectives.  10: 67-86.  privatzation and privatizaton from  below.  The author
finds that there are  two key lessons when  looking at
privatzation  in  transiton  economies.  Firsty  the
method  of  privatizabon  must vary  according to  the
specific SOE and  no 'grand  design" can be drawn up
for pnvatizing  a host of enterprises.  In  some  cases
the  majority  of  SOEs  can  only  be  realistically
privatzed by giving them away. The second lesson is
that it is difficult to achieve ownership by outsiders.
Claessens,  Stijn,  and  Simeon  The  study  uses  a  sample  of  706  When new managers are appointed  by private sector
Djankov.  1999a.  "Enterprise  privatzed Czech  firms during  1992-1997  owners  there  is  a  significant  improvement  in profit
Performance  and  Management  to  examine  the  effect  of  management  margins  and  labor  productivity.  New  managers  that
Tumover  in  the  Czech  Republic.'  tumover  on  changes  in  profitability  and  are  appointed  by  the  Nabonal  Property  fund  also
European  Economic  Review.  43:  labor productvity.  improve performance but not by as much.
1115-1124.
Claessens,  Stijn,  and  Simeon  Using  the  same  sample  data  as above  Concentrated  ownership  is  found  to  be  linked with
Djankov.  1999b.  'Ownership  this  study  looks  at  the  relatonship  higher profitability and labor productvity. The authors
Concentration  and  Corporate  between  ownership  concentrabon  and  also find that  non-bank-sponsored  investment  funds
Performance  in  the  Czech  profitability and labor productivity.  improve  performance  more  than  bank-sponsored
Republic."  Joumal  of Comparative  funds.
Economics.  27: 498-513.
Djankov,  Simeon.  1999a.  The  author  examines  the  relationship  It is found that when foreign ownership is significant
'Ownership  Structure  and  between  ownership  structure  and  firm  (greater  than  30  percent),  it is  positively  related  to
Enterprise  Restructuring  in  Six  restructuring  for  Georgia,  Kazakhstan,  restructuring.  Managerial  ownership  is  positively
Newly  Independent  States."  Kyrgyz  Republic,  Moldova,  Russia  and  related  to  restructuring  at low  levels (less than  10
Comparative  Economic  Studies.  Ukraine.  The sample  contains 960  firms  percent) and high levels of ownership,  but is negative
41(1):  75-95.  privatized  between  1995  and  1997  in  in  between.  Employee  ownership  is  found  to  be
these countries.  insignificant except at low levels of ownership where
it has a positive effect.
Djankov,  Simeon.  1999b.  'The  Using  the same  survey  data  as  above  Management  buy-outs  are  positively correlated  with
Restructuring  of  Insider-Dominated  this study looks at the effects of different  enterprise  restructuring.  Firms  that  are  privatized
Firms:  A  Comparatve  Analysis.'  privatzation  pattems on  the  process  of  through vouchers do not restructure  any more rapidly
Economic  Transition.  7(2): 467-479.  restructuring.  Georgia  (92  firms)  used  than state  owned  firms.  This implies that  incentives
voucher  privatizaon,  while  most  to  restructure  are weaker when  manages are  given
Moldovan  firms  (149  firms)  were  either  firms for free, since their income is not wholly based
purchased  by investment  funds  or  sold  on the success of the firm.
for cash to managers.
Djankov,  Simeon,  and Peter Murrell.  The  authors  identfied  more  than  125  Private ownership  produces  more  restructuring  than
2000.  The  Determinants  of  empirical  studies  that  examine  the  state-ownership  in Central  and  Eastem  Europe.  In
Enterprise  Restfucturing  in  determinants  of enterprise  restructuring.  contrast, evidence is mixed for the Commonwealth  of
Transition: An  Assessment  of the  The  paper  provides  a  comprehensive  Independent Sates  (CIS) countries. The privatization
Evidence.  Washington  D.C.:  The  review  of  the  empirical  results  of  effect in the non-CIS countries is more than twice the
World  Bank  (see  also  Djankov,  privatization  in  transitOn  economies  size  of  that  in  the  CIS  countrles.  Privatization  to
Simeon,  and  Peter  Murrell.  2000.  using  the  data  generated  by  these  foreign  owners  is  ten  times  as  productive  as
'Enterprise  Restructuring  in  studies.  privatkation  to  diffuse  indMdual  owners.  State
Transition:  A  Quantitatie  Survey."  ownership  within  traditional  stats  firms  is  the least
Washington  D.C.: The World Bank).  effective  type  of  ownership.  State  ownership  in
commercialized  enterprises,  however,  is  quite
effective.  Product  market  competition  has  been  a
major  force  behind  improvements  in  enterprise38
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productvity  in  transiton  economies.  Privatzabon,
hardened  budget  constraints,  and  product  market
competition  all  appear  to be  important  determinants
of enterprise  restructuring in non-CIS  counbies, while
they are less obviously so in the CIS.  The evidence
suggests  that the  difference  in impact  is  due to  the
varying  degree  of institutional development between
the regions.
Djankov,  Simeon,  and  Gerhard  This  paper  records  the  restructuring  The  authors  find  that  the  majority  of  large  Slovak
Pohl.  1997.  'Restructuring  of large  actions  and  ownership changes  of firms  firms  have successfully restructured without the need
Firms  in  Slovakia.'  The  William  in  Slovakia.  The  case  studies  were  for  foreign  investors  and  govemment-led
Davidson  Inshtute  Working  Paper  selected  to  give  a  wide  range  of initial  restructuring  programs.  Also  they  find  that
No.  73.  The  University of Michigan  conditions, and privatizabon techniques.  privatizabon to  insiders  did not hamper  restructuring
Business School.  as the managers invested heavily in new technology,
laid off large  numbers  of workers,  looked  for foreign
partners and were  prepared to sell controlling stakes
to  outsiders  in  retum  for  new  financial  resources.
These  findings  support  the  view  that  privatzabon
programs  should  aim  to  speedily  transform
ownership  and  not  be  overiy  concemed  with  the
selection of perfect owners.
Earle,  John.  1998.  'Post-  Looks  into  the  ownership  structure  and  The authors  use ordinary least squares regression to
Privatizabon  Ownership  and  its  impact  upon  labor  productivity  in  show a positve effect of increased private ownership
Productivity  in  Russian  Industrial  Russian  industrial  firms.  The  survey  upon  labor  productivity.  However  only  outsider
Enterpnses.  SITE  Working  Paper  sample  indudes  86  firms  that  were  ownership  is significantiy related with  such  changes.
127.  Stockholm,  Sweden:  100%  state-owned,  299  that  were  The  authors conclude  that placing insiders in control
Stockholm  Institute  of  Transibon  partially  privatized  and  45  that  were  of  a  firm  has  negative  long-run  implicabons  for
Economics.  newly  created.  The  1994  survey  data  restructuring.
examines  the impacts  of insider, outsider
or  state  ownership  upon  the
performance  of the firm.
Earle,  John  S.,  and  Saul  Estrin.  The  authors  used a  1994 survey data to  They find that 10 percentage point increase in  private
1998.  'Privatization,  Competition,  examine  whether  privatization,  share  ownership  raises  real  sales  per employee  by
and  Budget Constraints:  Disciplining  competition  and  hardening  of  budget  3-5  percentage  points.  Subsidies  (soft  budget
Enterprises  in  Russia.'  SITE  constraints  play  efficiency-enhancing  constraints)  reduce  the pace of restructuring  in state-
Working  Paper  128.  Stockholm,  roles in Russia.  owned fimis.
Sweden:  Stockholm  Institute  of
Transition Economics.
Dyck,  I.J.  Alexander.  1997.  This study looks into the Treuhand's role  The author attempts to rabonalize this approach  and
'Privatization  in  Eastem  Gefmany,  in  restructuring  and  privatizing  eastem  finds that those firms  owned  by westem  firms were
Management  Selection  and  Germany's  SOEs.  The  Treuhand  is  much more  likely to bring in  westem  managers  into
Economic  Transition.'  Amrencan  unique  in  that  it  privatized  more  than  key  position than  SOEs.  Treuhand  is also found  to
Economic Review.  87: 565-597.  13,800 firms  and parts  of firms  and had  have  attempted  to  open  sales to  all  buyers  rather
the resources  to pay for the  restructuring  than  favoring  eastem  Germans.  In  condusion
itself, but never actually did so. Instead  it  privatization  plans that  are open  to westem  buyers
sold  quickly  to  existing  westem  firms  and  allow  management  change  are  more  likely to
rather  than  giving  the  SOEs  away  or  exhibit improved  performance  in the firm.
selling them to capital funds.
Fischer,  Stanley, and  Ratna  Sahay.  The  paper  summarizes  the  macro-  The most successful  transiton  economies are  those
2000.  'The  Transition  Economies  economic  performance  of the  transition  that  have  both  stabilized  and  undertaken  con-
After  Ten  Years.'  IMF  Working  economies,  accounting  for  the  widely  prehensive reforms,  and the more and faster reform
Paper WP/O/30.  Washington D.C.:  differing  outcomes  in  the  25  countries  is better than less and slower reform.
Intemabonal  Monetary Fund.  covered in the study.  The  study  concudes  that  both  stabilization  polices
and  structural  reforms,  in  particular  privatization,
contribute to growth.
Frydman,  Roman,  Cheryl  Gray,  A  sample  of  medium  sized  SOEs  are  found  to  represent  significantly  higher
Marek  Hessel,  and  Andrej  manufacturing  firms  in  the  Czech  credit risks  than  private  or  privatized  fifns  due  to
Rapaczynski.  1998.  'The  Umits  of  Republic, Hungary and  Poland is used in  inferior  revenue  performance  and  the softer  budget
Discipiine:  Ownership  and  Hard  order  to discover the impact  of financial  constraints they face.  Since both of these factors act39
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Budget Constraints in the  Transiton  discipline  on  govemance  related  in tandem  it is not simply  enough  to impose  harder
Economies.'  Mimeo.  defidencies.  The  authors  argue  that  budget constraints  while the SOE is sUIll  not able to
although  financial  discipline  restrict  generate  enough  revenue  to  repay obligations. The
htto:/Iwww.ihs.ac.at/oublications/tecj  waste  and  force  better  cost  authors  therefore recommend  that budget constraints
te-5.od  management,  there  is a limit  to what  it  should only  be  hardened  if accompanied  by speedy
can  achieve.  Instead  they  put  forward  privatizabon.
that the firm's ultimate success is due to
the  level  of inventiveness,  creatvity and
readiness to accept risk.
Frydman,  Roman,  Cheryl  Gray,  Compares the  performance  of privatized  The  evidence  in the report  suggests that firms  that
Marek  Hessel,  and  Andrej  and  state  firms  in the  Czech  Republic,  are  privatized  and  controlled  by  outside  owners
Rapaczynski.  1999.  VVhen  Does  Hungary  and  Poland  using a  sample of  experience enhanced revenue and productivity, while
Privatization  Work?  The  Impact  of  218 mid-sized manufacturing  firms. 90 of  those  controlled  by  insiders  do  not  see  any
Private  Ownership  on  Corporate  these firms  were  under state control and  significant difference.
Performance  in  Transition  128  had  been  privaUzed.  The  report
Economies."  Quarterly  Joumal  of  focuses on  four aspects of performance:  Domestic  financial  companies  and  foreign  owners
Economics.  114(4):1153-1191.  sales  revenue,  employment,  labor  add  18 and  12 percentage  points  respectively to the
productivity,  and  labor  and  material  annual growth  rate  of the  firm. Outside  owners  also
costs.  The  authors  employ  panel  data  add 9 percentage points to productivity growth.  Other
regression  in  order  to  single  out  findings  conclude that  these  gains do not  come  at
ownership effects.  the  expense  of  increased  unemployment  and  that
insider  controlled  firms  are  much  less  likely  to
restructure.
Frydman,  Roman,  Marek  Hessel,  The study  looks at survey data from  506  The  authors  find  that  all  state  and  privatized  firms
and  Andrzej  Rapaczynski.  2000.  manufacturing  firms  in  the  Czech  conduct  similar types  of restructuring.  Firms  owned
'Why  Ownership  Matters?  Republic,  Hungary  and  Poland.  by outside  investors  have significantly  better results
Entrepreneurship  and  the  Compares  outsider,  insider,  and  state  when  conducting  product restructuring.  The authors
Restructuring  of  Enterprises  in  ownership  effects  on  entrepreneurship  conclude  that  outsider  owned  firms  are  more
Central  Europe."  The  Center  for  by looking at ability to increase revenues  entrepreneurial  due to  incentive,  rather than human
Law and Economic  Studies  Working  in privatzed firms.  capita, effects that are brought about by pnvatizaon.
Paper  172.  New  York:  Colombia
University School of Law.
Frydman,  Roman,  Cheryl  W.  Gray,  The study Is based on a large sample of  There  is  strong  evidence  that private  ownership-
Marek  Hessed,  and  Andrzej  mid-sized  firms  in the  Czech  Republic,  except  worker  ownership-dramatically  improves
Rapaczynski.  1997.  'Private  Hungary  and  Poland.  It compares  the  corporate  performance.  Privatzaton  is  associated
Ownership  and  Corporate  performance  of  privatized  and  state  with emploment Increases.
Performance:  Some  Lessons  From  firms.
Transition  Economies.'  Policy
Research  Worling  Paper  1830.
Washington  D.C.: World  Bank.
httn://econ.worldbank.orn/docs/628.
Ddf
Groves, Theodore,  Yongmiao Hong,  This  study  looks  at  changes  that  They find that this  led to  managers  paying  more in
John McMillan, and Barry Naughton.  occurred  In Chinese  firms  when  output  bonuses  and  hiring  more  workers  on  fixed-term
1994.  'Autonomy  and  Incentives  in  decisions  were  shifted  from  the  contracts.  These  incentives  led  to  an  increase  in
Chinese  State  Enterprises."  govemment  to the firm,  and when  firms  productvity.  The  greater autonomy  therefore  raised
Quarterly  Joumal  of  Economics.  were  allowed  to  retain  more  of  their  workers' wages and investment in the firm.
109:183-209.  profits.
Havrylyshyn,  Oleh,  and  Donald  The  paper reviews a seleclon of studies  Two dear lessons emerge from the literature:
McGettigan.  1999.  "Privatization  in  on privatization  experiences  in transition
Transition  Countries: A Sampling of  countries.  As  transiton  has  contnued  Private  enterprises  almost  invariably  outperform
the  Literature.-  IMF  Working Paper  and  as  more  empirical  studies  have  state-run  companies,  In  other  words,  any
WPW99/6.  Washington  D.C.:  been  undertaken,  it  appears  that  the  privatization  is  better  than  none,  regardless  of
Intemational Monetary Fund.  view that privatization was not central for  whether a stable,  competidve environment has been
restructuring  and  firm  performance  has  established first or not,
httoJ/twww.imf.orafextemaUlubslftw  been largely discredited.  Private companies that started from  scratch rank as
the  best  performers,  followed  by  newly  privatized
firms  run  by  outsiders,  either  local  or  foreign.
Privatzed companies dominated by insiders are least
effident and  productive,  but even these regularly do40
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better than state enterpnses.
It is tempting to conclude that the general market and
compettive  environment  is more  important than  the
method  of  privatzabon.  Eventually,  evidence  may
support this,  but the research so far does not  penmit
such  a conclusion.  Two  findings argue  in favor of it:
(I)  start-up  firms  outperform  others  no  matter  what
prvatization  method  is used;  and  (ii) the  success of
Central  European private sector development relabve
to  the former  Soviet Union  countries  partly reflects a
better property rights business environment  Perhaps
the most  Important lesson after a decade of transition
in  the  centrally  planned  economies  to  market-
oriented  systems  is  that pnvate  sector development
can  surely be  rated  a  success.  Despite a  handful  of
reversals  as  well  as  slowdown  in  1998,  most
transibon countries are now recording posibive growth
in  output-the  bottom  line  indicator  of  trends  in
efficlency.
Komai,  Janos.  2000.  'Ten  Years  Looks  at  the  pnvabzabon  process  in  The author suggests that hard budget constraints are
after 'The  Road to a Free Economy':  Hungary.  just as  important  as  pnvatzation,  liberalizabon  and
The  Authors  Self-Evaluation."  stabilization.  He  argues  that  harder  budgets
Working  Paper.  Cambridge,  MA:  constraints act as a selection process.  Those that are
Harvard University.  profitable  can be sold,  while  those  that are not  must
http)://www.woridbank.or/research/  be allowed to go bankrupt rather than  be given away.
abcde/washinaton  12/Idf  files/10ve
ars.odf
Lizal, Lubomir,  Miroslav  Singer, and  This  study  looks  at  the  effect  on  In  1991  it  is  found  that the  break-ups  had  posibve
Jan  Svejnar,  2001,  'Enterprise  performance effects  that the  break  up of  effects straight away  for both  master  and  spin off if
Break-ups  and  Performance  During  Czechoslovak  SOEs  had  including  both  the  firm  was either  medium  or small  in  size.  Larger
the Transition from  Plan to  Market,"  the  master  firm  and  the  spin  offs.  The  firms  suffered  negative  effects.  There  are  similar
Review of Economics and Statistics.  sample  contains  635  firms  from  1991  results for  the  break-ups  that occurred  in  1992  but
83(1): 92-99.  and 1992.  they are not statistically significant
Nellis, John.  1999. 'Time to Rethink  The paper reviews  the accomplishments  Countries  in  Central  and  Eastem  Europe  and  the
Privatzation  in  Transiton  and  shortcomings  of  privabtzabon  in  Balfic states - closer geographically,  historically and
Economies?"  IFC Discussion Paper  transition economies.  culturally  to  Westem  commercial  traditions  and
38.  Washington  D.C.:  Intemabonal  markets - have generally privatzed more  swiftly and
Finance Corporabon.  with  much  better  results  than  their  more  Eastem
counterparts.  Too much was expected and promised
httD:/ww.ifc.or/economics/Dubs/d  of  privatization  in  institubonally  weak  transibon
D38/dr38.pdf  economies  where  the  speedy,  massive,  insider-
oriented forms of privatizabon  have generally not,  so
far, led to the restructuring required  to allow firms to
survive and  thrive  in  compebtive  market  operabons.
Re-nabonalization  would  be  a  desperate  measure,
with  a  high  likelihood  of failure  because  the forces
and  condibons  that  lead  govemments  to  fail  in
privatzabon  are the  same that prevent  effective  and
efficient SOE management
Pinto,  Brian,  Marek  Belka,  and  This  study  surveys  75  SOEs  from  The  experiences of  Poland  show that  rapid  change
Stefan  Krajewski.  1993.  Poland  from  5  different  manufacturing  of  ownership  can  have  valuable  effects  by  giving
"Transforming  State  Enterprises  in  sectors  covering  the  period  1989-1992.  unambiguous  signals  changing  relative  prices  and
Poland:  Evidence on Adjustment  by  This  period looks at the 6 months prior to  indicating a commitment  to  hard budgets.  The study
Manufacturing  Firms."  Brookings  the  reform  program  and  two  and  a  half  also shows that restructuring  before privatzation can
Papers  on  Economic  Activity.  1:  years into it.  At the start of the survey all  have an impact that is just as great.
213-270.  of the firms  were  SOEs.  By  1992,  3 had
been privatized and 24 commercialized.
Pivovarsky,  Alexander.  2001.  'How  This  paper uses  data from  376 medium  The  authors  find  that  ownership  concentration  is
Does  Privatzaton  Work?  and  large  Ukrainian  enterprises  to  positively  correlated  with  enterprise  performance  in41
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Ownership  Concentration  and  investigate  the  relabonship  between  Ukraine,  and  that  ownership  by  foreign  companies
Enterprise  Performance in Ukraine."  ownership  concentrabon  and  enterprise  and  banks  is  associated  with  better  performance
IMF  Working  Paper  WP/01/42.  performance.  over domestic owners.
Washington  D.C.:  Intemational
Monetary  Fund.
Pohl,  Gerhard,  Robert E. Anderson,  The  study  analyzes  the  financial  and  Privatizabon has a large impact on  restructunng.  On
Sbjn  Claessens,  and  Simeon  operabng  data  (1992-1995)  for  more  average,  a  firm  that  has  been  privahzed  for  four
Djankov.  1997.  'Privatzaton  and  than  6,300  industnal  firms  in  seven  years will increase  productivity 3-5 tmes more  than a
Restructuring in  Central  and Eastem  countries:  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  similar firm  that is stil  in state ownership.
Europe:  Evidence  and  Policy  Hungary,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovak
Options."  World  Bank  Technical  Republic, and  Slovenia.  An econometric
Paper 368.  Washington  D.C.: World  analysis  measuring  changes  in  total
Bank.  factor  productivity is used  to identfy  the
govemment  polides  that  most
htto://www.worldbank.oro/ecspflfinal  encouraged firms to restructure.
/htmll/aDers/entr509.htrm
Sachs,  Jeffrey,  Clifford  Zinnes,  and  The  authors  examine  the  empirical  Privatzaton  involving  change-of-title  alone  is  not
Yair Eilat  2000.  'The  Gains  from  evidence  across  24  countnes  to  enough  to  generate  economic  performance
Privatzation  in  Transition  determine  whether  change-of-btle  alone  improvements.  While  reforms  directed  at prudental
Economies:  Is  Change  of  has  been  sufficient to achieve  economic  regulation,  corporate  govemance,  hardening  of
Ownership  Enough?"  CAER  performance  gains  or  whether  other  enterprise  budget  constraints,  management
Discussion  Paper  63.  Cambridge,  factors  (e.g.  institubons  to  address  objectves, and developing capital markets contribute
MA:  Harvard  Institute  for  agency  issues,  hardening  budget  to economic performance  on their own, the real gains
Intemational Development.  constraints,  market  compebtiveness, and  to privatzabon come from  complementing the  above
depolitisizabon  of firm  objectives as  well  with  change-of-Utle  reforms.  The  higher  the  level  of
httn://www.hiid.harvard.edu/caer2/ht  as  the  implementabon  challenge  of  prerequisite  reforms,  the  more  posibve  is  the
mlcontentl)aoers/confoubs/laoer63  developing  insfitutions  and  a regulatory  economic  performance  impact  from  an  increase  in
/paoer63.pdf  framework  to  address  them)  are  change-of-tite privatzabon.  In fact the study finds a
important  threshold  level  of reforms  in order  for change-of-tiUle
privatization  to  have  a  posibve  economic
performance  response.  The  conclusion  is  that while
ownership matters,  insttubons matter as much.
Shirley, Mary M., and  Uxin Coin Xu.  This  study  examines  the  performance  The large  sample of manufacturing  firms  shows  that
2000.  'Empirical  Effects  of  contracts  issued  in  China  and  their  on  average  these  contracts  do  not  improve
Performance  Contracts:  Evidence  effects on productvity.  performance.  However improvements  did occur in 38
from China.'  Paper presented  at a  percent of the firms in the study,  and these occurred
Senior  Experts'  meeting  on  where  the  performance  contract  provided  sensible
Corporate  Govemance  of  State-  targets,  stronger  incentives, longer  terms  and  were
owned  Enterpnses  in  China  in  based in  more competitive industries.
Beijing, on January 18-19. 2000.
Smith,  Stephen C.,  Beon-Cheol  Cin,  This  study  examines  the  impact  of  The  authors  find  that  a  one  percentage  point
and  Milan  Vodopivec.  1997.  foreign  and employee ownership  on firm  increase  in foreign  ownership  brings  about  a 3.9
'Privatization  Incidence,  Ownership  performance  using  a sample  of 22,735  percent  increase  in  value-added,  while  employee
Forms,  and  Firm  performance:  firm-years  of data  from  Slovenia  (1989-  ownership  adds  1.4  percent  to value-added.  Firms
Evidence  From  Slovenia.'  Joumal  1992).  with  higher  revenues,  profits  and  exports  are  also
of  Comparative  Economics.  25:  found to be more likely to have foreign and employee
158-179.  ownership.
D. Developed Countries
Allen,  Franklin,  and  Douglas  Gale.  An  overview  of  the  effectiveness  of  The  corporate  govemance  systems  operaing  in
1999.  'Corporate  Govemance  and  different  corporate  govemance  different counbries are distinct. In the U.S.  and U.K. it
Competition.'  Working  Paper.  strategies and competiion.  is often  argued  that  the  threat of takeover  ensures
Philadelphia,  PA  Wharton  School,  managers  act  in  the  shareholders'  interests.  In
The University of Pennsylvania.  countries such as  Germany,  Japan, and  France it is
suggested  banks  and  other  institutions  act  as
htto:/ffic.wharton.upenn.edufficlwfic;/  monitors.  There  is  some  evidence  that  neither
vaoers/99/9928.0df  system  is  particularly  effectve.  The  authors  argue
that competiton among  firms may be more effective
than  either  of  these  mechanisms  in  ensuring  that
resources are used efficenUy.42
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Boardman,  Anthony  E.,  Claude  This study  looks  at  the  performance  of  Retum  on  sales  or  assets  more  than  double  after
Laurin,  and  Aidan  Vining.  2000.  nine  Canadian  firms  privatized  between  privatzabon  and  efficiency,  sales  and  capital
Privatization  in  Canada:  Operating,  1988  and  1995.  A variety of 3-year post  spending  also  increase  significantly.  Leverage  and
Financial  and  Stock  Price  privatzation  ratios  are  compared  to  5-  employment decline significantly  as well.  Over long-
Performance  With  intematonal  year  pre  pnvatizabon  values.  Long-run  term  periods  the  privatzed  firms  outperform  the
Comparisons.'  Working  Paper.  stock  retums  are  also  calculated for the  Canadian stock market
University  of  Britsh  Columbia,  divested firms.
Vancouver.
Davidson,  Richard.  1998.  'Market  The author examines SIPs from  Austria,  The  results  show  a  long  period  of  market
Analysis:  Underperformnance  Over?'  France,  Italy, Spain and the  UK,  looking  underperformance  (1-1.5%  p.a.)  until  the  last  12
Privatisation Intemational Yearbook.  partcularly at 1, 3,  5,  and 10 year market  months  of  the  study  where  SIPs  outperform
London:  IFR Publishing.  adjusted  retums.  The  study focuses  on  European  market averages.
the period up unbl March 1997.
Kay,  J.A.,  and  D.J.  Thompson.  An overview of privatizabon  in  Britain.  This  report  concludes  that  while  privatizabon  in
1986.  'Privatisabon:  A  Policy  in  Britain  has  been  the most  popular  way in  which  to
Search  of  a  Rationale.'  Economic  boost  the  performance  of  previously  state-owned
Joumal. 96:18-32.  enterprises,  the  promoton  of compebbon  can  have
effects that are just as beneficial. This is particularly
true  if a  natural  monopoly  exists within  a  particular
industry.  Franchising  in  particular is an effective way
of  introdudng  competbon.  The  main  difficulty  in
achieving  this  is  resistance  from  the  incumbent
management  which,  the  authors  argue,  is  why
privatizabon  has become such  a widespread means
of improving SOE performance.43
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